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 States have historically used Certificate of Need (CON) regulations to regulate 
cost, quality, and access to healthcare services.  Federally mandated in 1974, the regulation 
required the states to review requests for new healthcare construction and services.  In 
theory, community-level planning backed by the state-level CON review and health 
planning process would prevent unnecessary duplication of services and the accompanying 
costs (Smith-Mellot, 2004).  However, none of the published studies have examined the 
association of CON regulation on volume and outcomes of solid organ transplants.  
 In 1984, the federal mandate ended, and each state was allowed to determine 
whether or not to maintain its CON programs; more than one-third of the states eliminated 
them (Altman & Ostby, 1991).  Currently, 37 states including the District of Columbia 
xv 
 
have CON programs (American Health Planning, 2010).  Of those states, 21 include organ 
transplant as a reviewable, regulated service. 
 Although several studies have investigated whether CON regulation has affected 
healthcare cost, to date very little has been written about the impact of CON on volume 
and quality of care; the data that does exist is contradictory.  In 1988, investigators studied 
the effects of CON regulation on mortality and observed that greater regulatory stringency 
was a positive and significant predictor of hospital mortality rates (Shortell & Hughes, 
1988).  In contrast, DiSesa et al (2006) found no significant difference in risk-adjusted 
mortality for cardiac surgery patients in states with and without CON regulations.  The gap 
between evidence and decision-making and the large number of states that use CON to 
regulate healthcare services indicate a need for a study on the quality of healthcare 
services.  Solid organ transplantation is a complex, high-cost treatment that was performed 
over 27,000 times in 2008.   
 The purpose of this study is to assess the association of solid organ transplant CON 
regulations using clinically rich data available from the Scientific Registry of Transplant 
Recipients (SRTR).  This study tests the hypotheses that states with solid organ transplant 
CON regulations have fewer transplant centers, higher volumes of heart and kidney 
transplants per center, lower graft failure rates and lower patient mortality rates per center.  
In addition, this study assesses these hypotheses using two different transplant procedures 
(heart and kidney).  This study provides additional information for transplant centers to use 
in their strategic decision making.  Moreover, with the presence of minimum volume 
standards for transplant procedures mandated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
xvi 
 
(CMS) now, the policy implications of continuing or repealing CON regulations should be 
examined.
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Within the last year a major healthcare bill was passed that will reform the U.S. 
healthcare system and it was one of the President‘s top legislative priorities.  Policy 
makers and providers seek to ensure the provision of high-quality healthcare while 
restraining cost growth.  Many states pursue these two goals by enforcing Certificate of 
Need (CON) programs.  CON is a regulatory system that requires healthcare providers 
to obtain prior authorization from the state for major capital expenditures and the 
offering of new or expanded services (Hyman, 1977).  CON regulations are intended to 
contain healthcare costs, ensure equal access and quality.  When CON regulation was 
first implemented, healthcare providers were reimbursed based on the cost of the 
services they provided, no matter how high that cost.  Their charges incorporated 
overhead expenses and the other costs of doing business, as well as the necessary profit 
margin.  Under this system overbuilding was costly because the expenses of inefficiency 
were built into reimbursement.  The regulatory mechanism of CON regulations was 
designed to control costs by limiting the expansion and duplication of services.  
 Now, some thirty years later, the competitive forces of managed care have 
transformed healthcare.  Provider payments are determined by capitation, fixed fees for 
services, and fee schedules that are the product of negotiation and have little or no 
bearing on the underlying costs.  Today‘s providers compete on price and quality of care 
– not costs—and are neither rewarded for nor bailed out when they overspend on 
facilities or technology.  Given these fundamental shifts, it is particularly important to 
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examine the effect of CON regulations.  Is CON relevant in today‘s healthcare 
environment?    
Regulation of healthcare resources began in 1948, with the passage of the Hospital 
Survey and Construction Act (PL 79-725), commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act.  The 
Act was intended to encourage the development of hospitals in rural areas because of a 
perceived shortage of healthcare facilities (Dunham, 1981).  The Act required states to 
institute health policy planning in order to receive federal funding for hospital construction 
(Sloan, 1988).   
Additional concerns were duplicated services and excess supply of equipment.  
Under fee-for-service insurance, hospitals would be fully reimbursed for the amount spent 
on patients.  Hospitals were also paid their total costs for services rendered to the elderly 
and the poor after the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in 1966.  The extensive 
coverage of hospital services from third-party payers had two effects:   it removed patients‘ 
incentive to look for the best offer, and hospitals being assured of profit by the payment 
methods had no incentive to be concerned with efficiency and the costs of treatment. 
Small hospitals emulated medical centers by adopting the latest technology and 
expensive equipment, disregarding the economy of scale.  The larger the number of 
hospitals in a community, the greater the need for each hospital to invest in expensive 
equipment to attract physicians and patients.  This non-price competition is termed as 
―medical arms race‖ (McGinley, 1995).  In addition, since hospitals were fully reimbursed, 
they could increase the capacity by adding more beds even when the occupancy rates were 
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low.  As a result, excess capacity and ―medical arms race‖ contributed to the ever-rising 
healthcare costs. 
As an attempt to control the supply side of the healthcare market to contain costs, 
in 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act 
(PL 93-641), which mandated each state to designate health planning agencies for CON 
reviews to determine whether the proposed projects were necessary for the needs of local 
communities.  Despite its intended purpose of restraining healthcare costs, the medical bill 
reached $332 billion in 1982, the first time the cost of healthcare exceeded 10% of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) (McGinley, 1995).  Subsequently, Congress repealed the 
mandate for state CON regulations in January, 1987.  Each state, however, was free to 
continue regulating healthcare facilities.   
Since then, 14 states have dropped CON regulations.  Conover and Sloan (1998) 
proposed several reasons why some states have chosen to abandon CON regulations.  In 
addition to CON, two other types of regulations were implemented to hold down costs.  In 
the late 1980s, Medicare adopted the Prospective Payment System (PPS), which greatly 
weakened hospitals‘ incentive to inflate costs and the growth of Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMOs) that pressured hospitals to lower costs by negotiating discounted 
rates.  Taken together, many policy makers believed that these regulations and market 
pressures would control healthcare costs, without CON laws. 
Today, the 37 states (and the District of Columbia) (see Appendix 1) that retain 
CON regulations have made them more flexible by raising review thresholds and limiting 
the scope of the regulations (Conover & Sloan, 1998). 
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The coverage and review thresholds vary considerably across these states.  
According to the 2010 National Directory State Certificate of Need Programs published by 
the American Health Planning Association (AHPA) (see Appendix 2), Vermont covers 30 
types of healthcare services and equipment, the highest coverage rate of all states.  Ohio 
has the lowest coverage: only for nursing home and long-term care beds.  Only 21 of the 
37 states that still have CON regulations include organ transplant services. 
While CON laws are a result of federal legislation, CON programs, where they 
exist, are based on state statutes, rules and regulations which designate an agency or board 
to administer the process of reviewing CON applications and authorize the CON 
regulatory review board or commission to promulgate regulations specifying the criteria by 
which CON applications are evaluated.  These criteria are commonly required to be created 
in conjunction with the state‘s long-term health plans and goals.  In the states where CON 
regulations are still in effect, CON programs constitute the most frequently used form of 
state health planning (Madden, 1999). 
The original intent of CON statutes was to control costs by regulating major capital 
expenditures and changes in healthcare services capacity (Chayer & Sonnenreich, 1978).  
CON regulations were designed to prevent duplication of healthcare services.  CON 
regulations are based on the theory that in an unregulated market, healthcare providers will 
provide the newest, most costly technology and equipment, regardless of duplication or 
need (Feldstein, 2005).  According to Ameringer (2008), if policy makers thought that 
government regulation in the 1970s would ―stem rising costs of healthcare, they were 
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mistaken‖ (p. 57).  Although CON regulations were intended to reduce healthcare costs by 
preventing duplication of services, healthcare costs continued to rise. 
The use of CON programs as a means of ensuring quality of care has been a matter 
of debate (Conover & Sloan, 1998).  Vaughan-Sarrazin et al. (2006) supported the 
contention that CON laws both increase coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) volumes and 
improve patient outcomes.  This analysis was limited to elderly patients, did not control for 
regional factors and, due to its reliance on an administrative database, did not adjust fully 
for clinical factors.  DiSesa (2006) found that CON states have higher hospital volumes but 
not better outcomes for coronary artery bypass grafting.  Supporting this finding, Ho 
(2004) and Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin and  Rosenthal (2006) both concluded that CON 
states have higher hospital cardiac procedure volumes but not better outcomes than do 
states without CON regulations. 
 The association between volume and outcomes appears to be strong.  Several 
studies (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Ho, 2004; Schrag et al., 2003) base their conclusions that 
increased volume decreases mortality among patients in high- and low-volume hospitals.  
Mortality rate, the likelihood to survive the procedure, is not the best or even the only 
indicator of quality outcomes.  Other indicators are likelihood of experiencing 
complications (complication rate), probability that a patient may be readmitted to the 
hospital (readmission rate), and length of stay.  In addition, patient data in the volume 
studies are often not ―risk-adjusted.‖  Risk adjustment takes into account the severity of a 
patient‘s illness upon admission to the hospital, and is necessary for an apple-to-apple 
comparison. 
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CON regulations also were intended to ensure quality of care and clinical 
proficiency by limiting the number of healthcare facilities performing complex medical 
procedures.  More than 100 studies have established a strong relationship between higher 
provider procedure volume and better outcomes (Conover & Sloan, 1998).  Luft, Bunker, 
and Enthoven conducted the pioneering study noting this link in 1979.  After another 
decade of research, Luft et al. (1990) reviewed the literature and concluded that there was a 
link between volume and quality.  Because CON is not associated with substantially 
lowering healthcare costs (Conover & Sloan, 1998; Sloan & Steinwald, 1980), the 
reluctance to eliminate CON regulation may be partly attributable to the impact on quality. 
 The Institute of Medicine‘s (IOM) reports, To Err is Human; Building a Safer 
Health System (Kohn, Corrigan & Donalson,1999) and Crossing the Quality Chasm: A 
New Health System for the 21st Century (2001) gave the healthcare industry a charge to 
make healthcare in America safer and of consistently high quality. All stakeholders in care 
are to be held accountable.  The second report outlines six aims for improving the 
healthcare system: all healthcare should be safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, 
efficient, and equitable.  Multiple stakeholders have a significant interest in using 
legislation or other regulatory means to ensure affordable and high quality healthcare for 
everyone.  This is especially true for treatments like coronary artery bypass grafting, in 
which differences in procedural quality can have a direct impact on patient outcomes.  
New York and Pennsylvania were among the first states to require all hospitals and 
practitioners performing CABG surgery to report case volumes and outcomes annually.  
Other states have followed.  Although the results of these surveys are available to the 
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public, their effects on quality of care have been difficult to measure (Birkmeyer, 2002).   
Other stakeholders, such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and 
industry consortia of high-volume purchasers of healthcare services (the Leapfrog Group, 
for example) have proposed volume and/or outcome criteria for certification of and 
payment for expensive services such as CABG surgery. 
 There is growing interest in the quality of healthcare and in the use of quality 
measures to direct patients to hospitals and providers offering high quality, low cost 
healthcare (Epstein, 1995; Clinton, 1993; Enthoven & Kronick, 1989).  Although 
tremendous strides in the development of quality measures have been made, there is still 
little agreement on what constitutes "quality,‖ how it should be measured, and how quality 
information should be used.  Some experts predict that it may be another 10 years before 
highly reliable and valid quality measures will be widely available (IOM, 2001).  The 
dilemma is that, while there is an increasing need for quality indicators as a result of a 
changing healthcare environment, this new environment has important implications for the 
use of these measures.    
 Since the 1970s, a growing body of research in the U.S. has addressed the 
empirical relationship between the number of surgical procedure and the outcomes after 
treatment in a particular hospital or by a particular physician ("volume-outcome" studies).  
Virtually all of the studies examining the relationship between volumes and outcomes 
have been conducted in the U.S. (a few have been conducted in Canada) (Banta, Engel & 
Schersten, 1992).  One reason is that European countries routinely regulate the number of 
facilities that are allowed to perform certain procedures, and thus there are fewer 
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institutions with low volumes.  The ready availability of routinely collected data on 
procedures, diagnoses, and outcomes in the U.S. also facilitates such research (Banta, 
Engel & Schersten, 1992). 
 The use of volume information in a regulatory context emerged from a healthcare 
market in the U.S. where cost-based reimbursement was still the norm, hospitals were the 
center of healthcare delivery, and the "medical arms race" drove hospitals to compete for 
physicians and their patients by offering more services and possibly better quality, 
although the latter was rarely measured explicitly.  Today, the driving market factors are a 
focus on consumer decision-making, the increasing dominance of managed care 
organizations, the consolidation of health plans and facilities, and the use of selective 
contracting through negotiations with purchasers.  This changing environment has added 
new complexities in using volume information, as well as other quality indicators, within 
both regulatory and market-oriented environments.  
 Despite this growing interest in assessing surgical quality, there remains 
controversy about how best to identify high-quality hospitals for individual procedures.  
Hospital procedure volume is currently among the most widely used quality indicators.  
There remains little doubt that volume is inversely related to mortality with many 
procedures (Birkmeyer et al., 2002; Dudley et al., 2000; Halm et al., 2002).  But critics 
state that volume is a crude surrogate for quality and a poor predictor of individual hospital 
performance (Christian et al., 2003; Hannan, 1999; Rathore et al., 2004).  Instead, many 
think that surgical quality is best judged by direct outcome measures, including mortality. 
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Overview of Study 
 Because of the lack of research for transplant procedures and the questions related 
to the best measures of quality, this study examines structure measure (centers and center‘s 
volume) as well as outcome measures (graft failure and patient death).  The question under 
examination by this study is whether or not solid organ transplant CON regulations for 
heart and kidney transplants makes a differences in the number of transplant centers and 
volume per center as well as the quality outcomes for transplant centers  in states with and 
without solid organ transplant CON regulations.  Previous studies have examined the 
impact of CON on volume and quality for coronary artery bypass grafts and coronary 
interventions but no studies have been done for the transplant populations.  This study 
would add to that knowledge and provide additional information for transplant centers to 
use in their strategic decision making.  With the presence of minimum volume standards 
for transplant procedures mandated by CMS, the policy implication of continuing or 
repealing CON laws should be examined.   
 The next chapter provides an overview of the history of Certificate of Need, the 
theoretical basis for CON laws, and the intent and structure of CON regulations.  The third 
chapter explores the relevant research. Studies of the quality, access, cost and expenditures 
of CON are reviewed. 
 Following the literature review, the study question and methodology utilized for 
this study are explained.  This study will use a clinically-rich database available from the 
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) on 101 adult heart transplant centers 
and 208 adult kidney transplant centers within the United States.  The years of study will 
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be 2006 through 2008, when the number of states with CON regulations for heart and 
kidney transplantation remained stable.  The variables of interest will be the number of 
transplant centers per state, the volume of transplants per center and the risk-adjusted graft 
failures and patient deaths per transplant center.  This study question is:  What is the 
association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of transplant centers 
per state and the volume and outcomes at heart and kidney transplant centers?  
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CHAPTER II 
CERTIFICATE OF NEED 
 
 In 1964, local businesses and Blue Cross in Rochester, New York established a 
community health planning council composed of payers, consumers and providers to 
evaluate the need for hospital beds.  The council concluded that there was a surplus.  This 
work led to the passing of the nation‘s first Certificate of Need (CON) regulations by the 
State of New York in 1966 (Dunham, 1981).  State and federal involvement in planning for 
health facilities has an extensive and well-documented history.  The regulation of 
healthcare resources began after World War II, with the passage of the Hospital Survey 
and Construction Act (Dunham, 1981), commonly known as the Hill-Burton Act (PL 79-
725), in 1946.  The enactment of federal CON regulations was the genesis of government-
mandated health policy planning.  While federal regulations provided legislation and 
enforcement provisions, most program development and implementation has taken place 
on the state or local level (McGinley, 1995). 
 The objective of CON regulations was to control costs by restricting provider 
capital expenditures.  The principle behind CON regulations is that excess capacity (in the 
form of facility overbuilding) directly inflates healthcare prices.  When a hospital cannot 
fill its beds, fixed costs must be met through higher charges for the beds that are used.   
 CON regulations originated to regulate the number of beds in hospitals and nursing 
homes, and to prevent overbuying of expensive equipment.  Mandatory regulation through 
health planning agencies determined the most urgent healthcare needs, contributed to 
solutions for these needs, and attempted to manage the fluctuations in prices often caused 
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by a competitive market.  The idea was that new or improved facilities or equipment would 
be approved based only on a genuine need in a community.  Statutory criteria often were 
created to help planning agencies decide what was necessary for a given location.  By 
reviewing the activities and resources of hospitals, the agencies made judgments about 
what needed to be improved.  Once need was established, the applicant organization 
(corporation, not-for-profit, partnership or public entity) was granted permission to begin a 
project.  
 
Development of Federal Regulations 
 The passage of the Hill-Burton Act marked the beginning of more than forty years 
of federally funded health policy planning (Sloan, 1988).  It was intended to encourage the 
development of hospitals in rural areas because of a perceived shortage of healthcare 
facilities after the Depression and World War II (Dunham, 1981).  The Act required states 
to institute health policy planning in order to receive federal funding for hospital 
construction (Sloan, 1988).  In addition to producing a plan delineating their healthcare 
needs, states were required to inventory existing healthcare facilities and designate a single 
agency for health policy planning (Dunham, 1981).  Between 1946 and 1971, the Hill-
Burton program provided financial assistance for the construction of new facilities to 60% 
of American hospitals (Dunham, 1981). 
 In 1964, New York became the first state to enact a statute authorizing the state 
government to determine whether or not there was a need for a new hospital or nursing 
home before it was approved for construction.  Four years later the American Hospital 
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Association (AHA) expressed an interest in CON regulations, and started a national 
campaign for states to generate their own CON regulations.   
 By 1974, 24 states had enacted CON regulations in response to the passage of 
Section 1122 of the 1972 Social Security Amendments (Hyman, 1977).  Section 1122 
allowed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to enter into agreements with 
states with a ―designated planning agency‖ responsible for determining whether healthcare 
facilities could make capital expenditures (Chayer & Sonnenreich, 1978).  Mandatory 
federal health policy planning did not exist before Section 1122 was passed and only five 
(5) states had health policy planning regulations.  Similar to CON regulations, Section 
1122 forced states to review capital expenditures exceeding $100,000, bed capacity 
changes, or ―substantial‖ changes in services (Mendelson & Arnold, 1993).  It was much 
more comprehensive than existing state CON regulations and covered all major healthcare 
institutions (Hyman, 1977).  States failing to institute health policy planning programs 
would lose their eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.  Because Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursement is a significant source of revenue for most healthcare 
facilities, healthcare facilities would comply with state CON regulations.  ―Two years after 
the passage of the ‗1122‘ amendments 37 states had opted to establish an agency for the 
purpose of implementing the federal law‖ (Hyman, 1977, p. 31).   
 The 1972 Amendments also established Professional Standards Review 
Organizations (PSRO) to control utilization of services and to review procedures (Ashby, 
1984).  PSROs preceded Professional Review Organizations (PROs), established in the 
mid-1980s to evaluate the reasonableness and necessity of inpatient services provided to 
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Medicare patients (Sloan, 1988).  Although advocates of PSROs argue that they have 
improved the quality of healthcare, the majority of evidence indicates that PSROs were 
used primarily to control costs, not to promote quality (Sloan et al., 2001).  A 1979 PRSO 
Program Evaluation study found that each dollar spent by states on reviewing CON 
applications yielded approximately 90 cents in reimbursement savings, a savings-to-cost 
ratio of about 0.9-to-1 (Congressional Budget Office, 1988).  However, in 1978, data 
indicated that only 40% of the costs of PSRO reviews were recouped (Congressional 
Budget Office, 1988).   
The National Health Planning and Resource Development Act (NHPRDA), enacted 
in 1974, pushed CON regulations to the forefront of government healthcare cost 
containment efforts.  The Act was designed to develop a ―national health planning policy‖ 
(National Health Planning and Resource Development Act, 1974) in response to the ―lack 
of uniformly effective methods of delivering healthcare, the substitution of ambulatory and 
intermediate care for inpatient hospital care, and the lack of basic knowledge regarding 
personal healthcare and methods for effective use of available services‖ (Rubel, 1976, p. 
4).  The Act required federal agencies to pass health policy planning guidelines and 
establish specific goals, priorities, and success criteria (Sloan, 1988).  It prompted states to 
enact CON statutes by guaranteeing federal funding for state CON review programs and 
conditioning the receipt of certain healthcare funding on enacting CON regulations 
(McGinley, 1995).  It required all 50 states to have a structure in place that involved the 
submission of proposals and obtaining approval from a state health planning agency before 
beginning any major capital projects such as building expansions or ordering new high-
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tech devices.  Many states implemented CON regulations in part because of the incentive 
of receiving CON federal funds.  As enacted, this federal oversight plan created 
disincentives for noncompliance with the mandated establishment of CON review 
programs.  In 1974, 23 states had CON statutes, and by 1983, all states except for 
Louisiana had a CON law (Louisiana passed CON regulations in 1991).   
 In the 1980s, however, the deregulation movement set the stage for the elimination 
of federal CON regulations.  Federal support for CON regulations ended in 1986 with the 
repeal of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (Madden, 
1999).  After the Act‘s repeal, state CON statutes were no longer federally subsidized 
(McGinley, 1995).  Legislators were concerned that CON regulations ―failed to reduce the 
nation‘s aggregate healthcare costs, and it was beginning to produce a detrimental effect in 
local communities (McGinley, 1995).  Ameringer (2008) states that an ―important reason 
why government planning and regulation failed to stem costs concerned weak financial 
incentives.‖  He goes on to state that the retrospective payment method established by 
Congress in 1965 gave ―physicians carte blanche to maximize fees and medical services.  
Physicians enhanced their income by doing more rather than less – by seeing more 
patients, by ordering more tests, and by performing more procedures.‖  The federal 
mandate was repealed in 1987, and its federal funding was withdrawn.  
  In the decade that followed, 14 states abolished their CON regulations.  However, 
36 states currently maintain some form of CON regulation, and even the 14 that repealed 
their state CON regulations still retain some mechanisms intended to regulate costs and 
duplication of services.  Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia also have CON 
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regulations.  States that have retained CON regulations tend to concentrate their activities 
on outpatient facilities and long-term care.  This is largely due to the trend toward free-
standing, physician-owned facilities that now constitute an increasing segment of the 
healthcare market.    
 While current CON regulations were modeled upon federal legislation, CON 
regulation is based on state statutes and rules and regulations which designate an agency or 
board to administer the approval process of reviewing CON applications and give authority 
to the CON regulatory review board or commission to promulgate regulations specifying 
the criteria by which CON applications are evaluated.  These criteria must usually be 
created in conjunction with the state‘s long-term health plans and goals.  In the states 
where CON is still regulated, CON statutes constitute the predominant form of state health 
planning.  State CON regulations generally have two functions: to develop a health plan 
that promotes equitable access to healthcare services; and, to review CON applications 
submitted by healthcare providers (Morrissey, 2001).  
 
The Theoretical Basis for CON 
 Roemer and Shain (1959) have argued that hospital beds would be intentionally 
filled by providers who induce ill-informed patients into hospital stays; this has been 
termed the ―Roemer effect.‖  They stated that an increase in the number of hospital beds 
per capita increased hospital utilization rates (Roemer and Shain, 1959), and this was an 
important underpinning of efforts to control hospital construction through health planning 
(Madden, 1999).  Attempts to measure the magnitude of the effect have yielded results 
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ranging from no effect to a one-to-one relationship and thus the research has been 
inconclusive.  One study (Ginsburg & Koretz, 1983) restricted its inquiry to Medicare 
patients and used a unique data base, thus avoiding many of the shortcomings of earlier 
studies.  This study concluded that a 10% increase in hospital beds per capita would 
increase hospital utilization by Medicare enrollees by about 4%.  While the basis of the 
argument might have been valid during the ―cost-plus reimbursement era‖, it is widely 
asserted that it has not been demonstrated to be the case today, an era characterized by the 
shifting of financial risk to providers (Morrisey, 2001). 
In response to rising healthcare costs,  the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) have transitioned from reimbursing providers on a cost-plus or fee-for-
service basis to the prospective payment system (PPS), under which reimbursement is set 
before the service is provided (Madden, 1999).  CMS originally paid for hospital services 
using a ―cost plus‖ reimbursement basis, where hospitals were paid for all their costs and 
more.  Under this reimbursement system, hospital profits were directly linked to patient 
volumes.  In 1983, ―cost-plus‖ reimbursement was replaced by a prospective payment 
system defined by ―diagnosis-related groups‖ (DRGs) based on the patient‘s primary 
diagnosis.  Under this reimbursement system, hospitals have the financial risk of providing 
services efficiently under a set fee scale for a given diagnosis. 
The premise of CON regulations was simple: lower costs by reducing duplication,  
The term ―duplication‖ is often called ―excess capacity‖ and it is used in the assertion that 
societal costs increase when there are ―too many‖ providers of the same health service 
(Madden, 1999).  Madden (1999, p 1651) summarized studies of excess capacity saying, 
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―Without a clear statement of this standard (e.g., the correct number of hospital beds), we 
cannot determine what constitutes too many.‖  The research literature provides no clear 
statement (Madden, 1999). 
 
Arguments For and Against CON 
 Advocates of CON regulations say that healthcare is not a ―typical‖ economic 
product.  They argue that many ―market forces‖ do not obey the same rules for healthcare 
services as they do for other products.  In support of this argument, it is often pointed out 
that, since most health services (like an x-ray) are ―ordered‖ for patients by physicians, 
patients do not ―shop‖ for these services as they do for other commodities.  This makes 
hospital, lab and other services insensitive to market effects on price, and suggests a 
regulatory approach based on public interest. 
 The American Health Planning Association (AHPA) is the professional group of 
state agencies responsible for regulation and planning.  They identify three factors that 
suggest the need for CON regulations.  The primary argument is that CON regulations 
limit healthcare spending.  CON regulations can promote appropriate competition while 
maintaining lower costs for treatment services.  The AHPA argues that by controlling 
construction and purchasing, state governments can oversee what expenditures are 
necessary and where funds will be used most effectively.  This helps eliminate projects that 
detract attention from more urgent and useful investments and reduces excessive 
costs.  AHPA also asserts that CON regulations have a valuable influence on the quality of 
care.  When facilities and equipment are monitored, hospitals and other treatment centers 
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can ascertain what sort of services are in demand and how well patients are being taken 
care of.  
 Supporters also contend that the programs distribute care to areas that new medical 
centers are likely to ignore.  CON regulations are a resource for policymakers.  CON 
regulations are described as a reliable way to implement planning policies and practices, 
and to distribute healthcare to all populations.  The CON process can call attention to 
underserved areas in need because planners can track and evaluate the requests of 
hospitals, doctors and citizens and see which areas need improvement and development.  
 CON regulations also have been subject to wide criticism.  To start, opponents 
argue that it is not clear that these state-sponsored programs actually controlled healthcare 
costs.  For example, by restricting new construction, CON regulations not only reduce 
price competition among facilities, but may actually keep prices high.  Barriers to new 
building are seen as unfair restrictions, sometimes by both existing facilities and by 
potential new competitors.  There is little compelling proof that overcapacity or duplication 
leads to higher charges.  In 2004 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department 
of Justice both claimed that CON regulations actually contribute to rising prices because 
they inhibit competitive markets that should be able to control the costs of care and 
guarantee quality and access to treatment and services (FTC & DOJ, 2004). 
 Some opponents believe that changes in the Medicare payment system (such as 
paying hospitals according to Diagnostic Related Groups or DRGs) would obviate the need 
for external regulatory controls, because healthcare organizations would be more subject to 
market pressures.  Some critics have pointed out that the CON regulations are not 
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consistently administered.  A ―flexible‖ program could allow development, to the dismay 
of competitors.  A ―restrictive‖ program could limit competition, with the same effect.  
Many argued that health facility development should be left to the economics of each 
institution, in light of its own market analysis, rather than being subject to political 
influence. 
 Some evidence suggests that lack of competition has paradoxically encouraged 
construction and additional spending.  Some opponents of CON regulations believe an 
open healthcare market, based on quality rather than price, might be the best means of 
containing rising costs.  Proponents of CON regulations disagree.  This debate rests on the 
same arguments as many other ―Regulated market‖ vs. ―Open market‖ discussions.  
 In theory, CON regulations are granted based on objective analysis of community 
need, rather than the economic self-interest of any single facility.  However, opponents of 
CON regulations claim that the programs have not worked this way.  They cite cases in 
which CON regulations were apparently enacted on the basis of political influence, 
institutional prestige or other factors apart from the interests of the community.  
Furthermore, it is sometimes a matter of debate what sort of development is actually in the 
community‘s interest, with people of good will sharply divided. 
A central argument against CON regulatory policy is that by intervening in the 
market, natural market forces are disrupted and is significantly anti-competitive (Feldstein, 
2005).  As a result, CON regulations are often barriers to new market entrants and many 
healthcare economists see them as a strong disincentive to reaping the benefits of new 
technologies.  Porter et al. (1994) states: 
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In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition 
 compels companies to deliver increasing value to customers.  The fundamental 
 driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation.  
 Without incentives to sustain innovation in healthcare, short-term cost savings 
 will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs 
 of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything 
 less than the best treatments available.  Inevitably, the failure to promote 
 innovation will lead to lower quality or more rationing of care—two equally 
 undesirable results. (p. 131) 
Furthermore, there is consensus among researchers that competition among 
providers drives quality-of-care, patient outcomes, and cost efficiency (Smith-Mello, 
2004).  According to Madden (1999, p. 1659), ―there is . . . agreement across all 
perspectives of [health economics theory] on one issue: the negative consequence of too 
much concentration of economic power.‖  Hospitals in more competitive markets have 
been demonstrated to have average costs below those of less competitive markets 
(Zwanziger & Melnick, 1996).  Competition appears to give economic power to patients 
and payers by creating choices for consumers and raising quality standards as providers 
compete for patient loyalty.  When patient choice is diminished, decisions about access, 
quality, and beneficial outcomes become the purview of oligopolistic market players who, 
as decision makers acting in the absence of healthy competition, are free to ignore patient 
demands and needs (Brown et al., 1992).   
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 CON regulations are an example of a governmental regulatory policy that is often 
in conflict with the goals of antitrust enforcement, and have been regularly denounced by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  Seeking to preserve competition in healthcare 
markets, the FTC has opposed CON regulations in a 2004 joint study with the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).  The agencies believe that CON regulations are not successful in 
containing healthcare costs, and that they pose serious anticompetitive risks that usually 
outweigh their purported economic benefits (FTC & DOJ Report, 2004).  Market 
incumbents can too easily use CON procedures to forestall competitors from entering an 
incumbent‘s market.  The vast majority of single-specialty hospitals—a new form of 
competition that may benefit consumers—have opened in states that do not have CON 
regulations. 
 Two important factors determine the number of hospitals competing in a given 
market:  economies of scale and barriers to entry.  Entry barriers increase the market 
power—hence profitability—of those hospitals currently in the market (Feldstein, 2005).  
CON regulations restrict the healthcare market by preventing healthcare providers from 
choosing the types and amounts of care they will offer – and even whether they may enter 
the market at all.  Economic theory predicts that providers already in the market will react 
to CON regulations in two ways: altering their labor and capital mix, and raising prices 
(Saikever & Bice, 1976).   
 To produce goods, firms employ a mix of capital and labor.  CON regulations 
restrict capital investments – especially beds – but not labor.  Consequently, firms that 
want to expand or retain their market shares will shift investment from categories that are 
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under intense scrutiny, like enhancing facilities and adding beds, to those that are less 
closely monitored by CON regulations, such as labor and perhaps equipment.  
 By restricting entry and exit, CON regulations grant firms monopoly power.  Under 
CON regulations, then, healthcare providers are monopolists that will charge higher prices 
because they do not face competition from other firms.  CON regulations encourage prices 
to rise by limiting the amount of certain healthcare services that monopolists may provide 
to patients.  These caps make services more valuable to consumers at the margin, further 
pushing up prices.  This effect is especially likely in healthcare, since insurance decreases 
the price sensitivity of most consumers.  At the same time, though, price increases might 
not reach their full potential because managed care firms make great efforts to lower costs.  
Although a thorough literature review revealed no studies that examine the association of 
CON regulations on pricing, economic theory strongly predicts that such regulations would 
raise prices.  Capping prices through mandated rate-setting would be the only way to 
ensure that prices do not rise under CON regulations. 
 Another likely effect of monopoly power is that a healthcare provider will have 
fewer incentives to improve or maintain efficiency and quality.  Kessler and McClellan 
(2000) offered some support for this argument.  The researchers found that after 1990, high 
levels of hospital competition both lowered costs and improved outcomes for Medicare 
beneficiaries.  In states with CON regulations, the healthcare market is further distorted 
because CON regulations do not apply to all healthcare services.  Services such as 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which are exempt from CON regulations, are free to 
proliferate.  Such uneven application of CON regulations gives an advantage – and 
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incentive – to firms and individual providers to supply more unregulated services, which 
are not necessarily needed more by the community. 
 
Intent and Structure of CON Regulations 
 The assumption underlying CON regulations is that excess capacity (in the form of 
facility overbuilding) directly inflates healthcare prices.  When a hospital cannot fill its 
beds, fixed costs must be met through higher charges for the beds that are used.  Larger 
institutions have higher costs, so supporters of CON regulations claim that it makes sense 
to limit facilities by building only enough capacity to meet actual needs.  
CON statutes were intended to regulate the number of beds in hospitals and nursing 
homes, and to prevent overbuying of expensive equipment.  Mandatory regulation through 
health planning agencies determined the most urgent healthcare needs, contributed to 
solutions for these needs, and attempted to manage the price fluctuations that are often 
caused by a competitive market.  The idea was that new or improved facilities or 
equipment would be approved based only on a genuine need in a community.  Statutory 
criteria often were created to help planning agencies decide what was necessary for a given 
location.  By reviewing the activities and resources of hospitals, the agencies made 
judgments about what needed to be improved.  Once such a need was established, the 
applicant organization (corporation, not-for-profit, partnership or public entity) was 
granted permission to begin a project.  These approvals generally are known as 
"Certificates of Need."  
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 CON regulations are now established by state law.  CON regulations prohibit 
identified health facilities, services or equipment from being initiated, upgraded or 
modernized, expanded, relocated or acquired without a certificate from that state 
determining that the facility, service or equipment is needed.  Criteria for the approval or 
denial of a CON application are established by law or regulation as review standards and 
include cost, quality and access considerations.  Covered facilities, services or equipment, 
like review standards, vary from state to state.   
The latest data available indicates that 37 states including the District of Columbia 
have CON regulations applying to at least one service or medical procedure and 14 states 
do not (Appendix 2).  Ten CON-regulated states do not include acute care hospitals in their 
program, but all 36 include long-term care.  The number of services covered by any one 
state program varies from 1 to 30 and there are wide variations in how the programs are 
administered. Transplant services are covered in 21 states. 
Since the inception of CON programs, many changes occurred in healthcare 
financing and delivery rendering most of the fiscal benefits expected from CON 
obsolete in today‘s market place.  A significant change is the shift from cost-based 
reimbursement methodologies toward service-based payment methodologies. Many 
private healthcare insurance companies as well as large public programs such as Medicare 
and Medicaid adopted service based payments methods such as inpatient prospective 
payment system, diagnostic related groups, resource utilization groups, outpatient 
prospective system, ambulatory payment classification system, and managed care capitation 
rates over the last two decades.  The trend toward service-based payments reduced 
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provider incentives to build excess capacity or take on unneeded capital investment 
projects, as they cannot directly recover the cost of their investments.  Thus, this concern 
does not seem to have validity in today‘s healthcare market as it did 30 years ago. 
With the changes in the healthcare environment it is important that CON 
regulations are examined for relevancy and usefulness.  This study examines specifically 
the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of transplant 
centers per state, the volume and the outcomes for heart and kidney transplant centers.  
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter reviews the literature on the association of Certificate of Need (CON) 
regulations on healthcare in addition to the literature on volume and quality.  Three major 
areas of healthcare delivery are discussed here – quality, access, and costs -- in relationship 
to CON regulations.  An interactive relationship exists among the cost of healthcare, 
people‘s ability to obtain needed healthcare services, and the quality of services.  This 
review of literature focuses on the studies of volume and quality and the influence of CON 
regulations since this is the main focus of this study.  
 The literature on the influence of CON regulations on access, quality and costs is 
mixed.  Empirical research does not appear to support the claim that CON regulations 
reduce healthcare costs.  CON regulations have not been found to be effective in 
controlling overall per capita healthcare spending because many factors affecting costs 
such as labor and physician services are beyond the scope of the CON regulations.  Nor 
has CON regulations been found to be effective in controlling hospital costs because (a) 
not all services are regulated under CON regulations, (b) CON regulations are not always 
effective in controlling supply, and (c) when bed supply was controlled, expenditures per 
bed have been found to increase (Arnold & Mendelson, 1992; Conover & Sloan, 1998: 
Custer, 1997; Delaware Health Commission, 1996; Lanning et al., 1991; Mendelson & 
Arnold, 1993; Salkever, 1978). 
 The empirical evidence on the access impact of CON regulations is limited and 
contradictory.  In some studies, CON regulations have been found to protect inner city 
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facilities and enhance healthcare access while in other studies CON regulations are shown 
to have restricted needed services.  The effects of access seem to vary by state and by 
service.  Finally, there appears to be lack of empirical evidence on the rural access effects 
of CON regulations (Arnold & Mendelson, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Delaware Healthcare 
Commission, 1996; Hackey, 1993; Kiel, 1993; McGinley, 1995; Mendelson & Arnold, 
1993; Rettig, 1992; Sloan, 1988; Weaver, 1995). 
 Evidence is inconclusive regarding the ability of CON regulations to improve 
quality by forcing high utilization of equipment or services even though high utilization 
rates have been found to improve outcomes.  There is some evidence that CON regulations 
protect quality in the home health sector by filtering out unprepared or unqualified 
providers.  CON regulations effect on preventing for-profit providers from participating 
and the resulting effect on quality are mixed.  Finally, findings indicate that CON 
regulations do not provide an ongoing mechanism for monitoring quality (Arnold & 
Mendelson, 1992; Brown et al., 1992; Burling, 1998; Collins & Keane, 1997; Conover & 
Sloan, 1998; Delmez et al., 1992; Delaware Healthcare Commission, 1996; Federal Trade 
Commission, 1986; Griffiths et al., 1994; Irvin, 1998; Lanning et al., 1991; Luft et al., 
1990). 
 
Access 
 In theory, CON regulations improve access to healthcare (a) by limiting entry of 
new providers who may limit the ability of incumbents to provide unprofitable services, 
(b) by restricting expansion of facilities in overbuilt areas leading providers to expand 
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services in underserved areas, and (c) by requiring providers to serve all patients needing 
care in a particular area.   
 Sloan and Steinwald (1980) found a 1.4% additional increase in bed supply in the 
year prior to CON regulations implementation and attributed this to the anticipatory effects 
of CON laws implementation.  After CON regulations implementation, providers shifted 
investments to those areas not covered by CON regulations, such as hospital equipment.  
In addition, empirical analysis of labor inputs indicated that CON regulations tend to 
increase labor employment as an unintended, although compensatory effect of CON 
regulations (Sloan & Steinwald, 1980).  The study observed 1,228 U.S. hospitals from 
1969 to 1975, including labor inputs and simultaneous assessment of several concurrent 
regulatory programs in an attempt to isolate the effects of CON regulations from those of 
other regulatory programs in place (Sloan & Steinwald, 1980). 
 However, opponents of CON regulations point out that the remaining firms would 
be unable to raise prices to monopoly levels because competitors could easily enter the 
market.  ―Attempts by providers to reduce costs, gain efficiencies of scale, and position 
themselves aggressively in the marketplace have results in the formation of vertical 
integrated delivery systems of such providers‖ (Montesino, 1996). 
 Studies suggest that specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) – 
which most frequently arise in the absence of CON regulations – have the potential to 
drain nonprofit providers‘ financial resources and provide less charity care.  The U.S. GAO 
(2003) discovered that most specialty hospitals focus on highly profitable services and 
often are not located in geographic areas of medical need.  Mitchell (2005), who compared 
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specialty and general hospitals in Arizona, a state without CON regulations, found 
evidence to support the GAO‘s conclusions.  She found that physicians with ownership 
stakes in specialty hospitals treated higher percentages of profitable cases, less severe 
cases, and better-insured patients.  Further suggesting that specialty hospitals might harm 
access, Gruber (1994) found that less charity care was provided in California after it 
abandoned CON regulations.   
 Other research, however, concludes that the absence of CON regulations do not 
necessarily lead to more services, abandonment of cities or charity care, or a proliferation 
of for-profit hospitals.  Anderson, Heyssel, and Dickler (1993), comparing the presence of 
CON regulations in Baltimore and their absence in Minneapolis-St. Paul did not find clear 
differences in service offerings.  However, a study that compares the effect of CON 
regulations on services in cities to that of suburbs would be more useful, since most 
supporters of CON regulations are concerned that free exit will leave inner cities bereft of 
healthcare as services are shifted to more lucrative suburbs.  This question was addressed 
qualitatively by Bazzoli, Gerland, and May (2006).  They reviewed recent facilities 
construction in many markets and concluded that CON regulations do not influence 
whether construction occurs in cities or suburbs.  Regardless of CON regulations, more 
ambitious projects were launched in affluent suburbs than in poor cities. 
 Shortell et al. (1986) asserted that the provision of charity care would not be 
threatened by eliminating CON regulations because the proportion of uncompensated care 
does not differ between non- and for-profit hospitals.  Another study, though, found that 
31 
 
those results are not meaningful, because the number of for-profit hospitals is unlikely to 
greatly increase upon the removal of CON regulations (Conover & Sloan, 1998). 
 
Costs and Expenditures 
 The initial driving force for the CON regulations, in addition to the 1974 federal 
mandate, was the concern that excess capacity and capital investment contributed to higher 
publicly funded healthcare costs, as early 1970s healthcare payments were based on cost-
based reimbursement methodologies.  Under these methodologies, providers were 
reimbursed for their capital costs and had incentives to build excess capacity.  Since the 
inception of CON regulations, many changes have occurred in healthcare payment 
methodology, rendering most of the fiscal benefits expected from CON regulations 
obsolete in today‘s marketplace.  A significant change is the shift from a cost-based 
reimbursement methodology to service-based methodologies.  Most private healthcare 
insurance companies and large public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid have 
adopted services- based payment methods such as prospective payment systems, diagnostic 
related groups, outpatient prospective payment over the last two decades.  The trend 
toward service-based payments reduced provider incentives to build excess capacity or 
take on unneeded capital investment projects as they cannot directly recover the cost of 
their investments. 
 Salkever and Bice (1979) demonstrated that CON regulations from 1968 to 1972 
had no appreciable effect on total hospital investment but did result in a decrease in the rate 
of growth in bed supply and an increase in investment in quality enhancing projects.  
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Additionally, analyses based on all states combined, from 1968 to 1972, found that CON 
regulations applied to a typical state would have reduced the number of inpatient days, a 
small increase cost per inpatient days, and a very modest reduction in hospital costs per 
capita (Salkever & Bice, 1979).  Moreover, no significant savings in hospital costs were 
achieved through CON regulations as any savings from lower admission rates and hospital 
stays resulting from control over bed growth were approximately offset by higher than 
average per diem costs resulting from upgrading the level of care (Salkever & Bice, 1979). 
 Anderson and Kass (1986) examined the justification for requiring CON approval 
before new firms could begin providing home healthcare services.  Like studies of the 
impact of CON regulations on hospitals, this study found no evidence that CON 
regulations contribute to lower costs for the provision of home healthcare services and, if 
anything CON regulations are associated with on average two percent higher costs for 
firms operating in regulated states (Anderson & Kass, 1986).  Moreover, operating under 
CON regulations was more costly due to administrative in addition to the seeming lack of 
cost containment benefits (Anderson and Kass, 1986). 
 Noether (1987) reported that CON regulations significantly limit entry into the 
hospital market.  While for-profit institutions were once subject to more stringent CON 
regulations than non-profit institutions, non-profits no longer have this advantage 
(Noether, 1987).  Studies show that where entry into the market is regulated by CON 
regulations, both prices and expenses are higher than in areas without such regulation.  
Despite CON regulations‘ function as a potential entry barrier, its primary effect is less 
efficient resource utilization which is then passed on in the form of higher prices (Noether, 
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1987).  Noether estimated that states with CON regulations on average have higher prices 
and expenses averaging 1.8 to 2.6% and 1.2 to 2.4% higher, respectively, than those 
without.  Nor did he find evidence that CON regulations produced the resource savings 
they were designed to provide.  It concludes that plans and decisions to repeal CON 
regulations in some states should, in theory, increase consumer welfare (Noether, 1987). 
 Sherman (1988) analyzed data from 1983 to 1984 from the ―1984 Annual Survey 
of Hospitals‖ conducted by the American Hospital Association, using data from 
approximately 6,300 short-term general acute care hospitals.  Output costs were measured 
by five variables:  total number of inpatient days spent in acute care; total number of 
inpatient days spent in intensive care; patient days spent in sub-acute care or other 
departments; all visits to hospital emergency departments; and, clinic and other outpatient 
visits made to hospital (Sherman, 1988). 
 Results of the study indicated that as states review fewer hospital expenditures, 
hospital costs do not increase (Sherman, 1988).  Rather, hospital costs are lower in states 
that have set higher review thresholds for all types of hospital expenditures.  Moreover, it 
was estimated that if states were to significantly relax their regulatory constraints by 
doubling the thresholds at which hospital expenditures were subject to CON regulations, 
total hospital costs would decline by 1.4% (Sherman, 1988).  The study posits that the 
reason for increased costs despite CON regulations are because CON regulations assume 
that by reducing the amount of capital and equipment available to hospitals, the total cost 
of resources will decrease (Sherman, 1988).   
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 Sloan et al. (1988) evaluated several of the arguments made by proponents of CON 
regulations.  One argument in support of CON regulations was that ―in the absence of 
regulation, firms will drop prices so low that most will fail, leaving the market to a 
monopolist or a few oligopolists‖ (Sloan et al., 1988).  Providers have been shown to 
accelerate investments in facilities and equipment in anticipation of the implementation of 
CON regulations (Sloan et al., 1988).  Such behavior is cited as demonstrating the 
willingness of providers to ―play the system.‖  Thus, existing providers support CON 
regulations to prevent competition. 
 A 1992 study by Anderson examined the effect of CON regulations on hospital 
capital investment and operating expenditures.  Previous studies had found that hospital 
capital investments significantly raised operating costs.  However, a 1987 assessment of 
prior studies found that although current capital expenditures increased future operating 
expenditures, it estimated that the overall effect was much less than previously reported 
(Anderson, 1992).  The study advised, ―As Congress debates whether to incorporate capital 
into the Medicare Prospective Payment System, our results suggest that controlling the rate 
of increase in operating expenses may only negligibly deter capital expansion by hospital 
administrators‖ (Anderson, 1992). 
 Most evidence suggests that CON regulations do not substantially reduce or contain 
healthcare expenditures.  Neither CON regulations nor other types of regulation are 
associated with lower costs, according to an econometric analysis of 22 years of data by 
Antel, Ohfeld, and Becker (1995).  As previously discussed, Salkever and Bice‘s early 
(1976) study of the financial effects of CON regulations found that these regulations did 
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not suppress overall hospital investment but exacerbated the medical arms race.  Although 
CON regulations slowed bed expansion, they more substantially sped up investment in 
new services and technologies, substituting a growth in labor and services for a growth in 
beds (Salkever & Bice, 1976).  Similarly, Conover and Sloan (1998) found that CON 
regulations slightly lowered acute care spending but neither slowed the diffusion of 
hospital-based technologies nor reduced total spending.  Bazzoli, Gerland, and May (2006) 
noted that some markets are developing duplicative services and technologies, despite the 
presence of CON regulations. 
 Feldman‘s 2000 meta-analysis of CON regulations and government market process 
concludes that the ―empirical literature on CON regulations is extensive, and virtually 
unanimous in its consensus that CON regulations have neither controlled hospital costs nor 
restrained service diffusion‖ (Feldman, 2000, p. 245).  The studies reviewed by Feldman 
indicated that CON regulations have resulted in higher profits for for-profit hospitals, and 
have prevented entry of new providers into the market to the benefit of existing providers 
(Feldman, 2000).  This restriction into the market is described as especially significant 
given the increased competitiveness due to the spread of managed care entities.  Moreover, 
recent studies indicate that CON regulations tend to increase costs, rather than achieve 
their designed purpose of controlling costs, with hospitals in states regulated by CON 
regulations having costs 20.6% higher than those in states with no CON regulations 
(Feldman, 2000). 
 The empirical literature reviewed in the Feldman meta-analysis also suggests that 
CON regulations have not been effective in restricting the diffusion of new technologies, 
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including open-heart surgery, renal dialysis programs, and CT scanner (Feldman, 2000).  
Case studies from Policy Analysis-Urban Systems (1980), cited by Feldman, suggest this 
lack of effectiveness resulted from hospitals being able to avoid CON regulations by 
leasing CT scanners, purchasing mobile units, or purchasing units right below CON 
regulatory threshold (Feldman, 2000). 
 In 1998, the Joint Legislative and Audit Review Committee and the Health Policy 
Analysis Program of the University of Washington‘s School of Public Health and 
Community Medicine conducted a study of the CON Program in Washington State, 
examining the effects of CON regulations and its effect on the cost, quality, and 
availability of healthcare services, as well as CON regulations‘ effect on charity care and 
access to health services in rural areas (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).  Results based 
on a literature review, interviews and information from healthcare providers and healthcare 
economic experts in the state, in addition to the analysis of states that completely or 
partially repealed their CON regulations, found strong evidence that CON regulations are 
not effective either in controlling healthcare spending or in controlling supply (State of 
Washington JLARC, 1999).  This study found that while CON regulations can slow the 
expansion of some healthcare services, other factors that CON regulations do not control 
also affect healthcare costs.   
 Further, the evidence gathered in this study, regarding the effect of CON 
regulations on quality, and the ability of CON regulations to improve quality by 
concentrating volume of specialized services is weak and inconclusive, with only some 
indirect evidence suggesting that CON regulations may protect quality in home health and 
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hospice by keeping out unprepared or unqualified providers, mainly due to the fact that 
CON regulations do not provide an ongoing mechanism to monitor quality (State of 
Washington JLARC, 1999).   
 This study found conflicting evidence regarding the effect of CON regulations or 
its repeal on access to health services, particularly in rural areas.  Although CON 
regulations have been used to protect existing facilities in inner cities or to encourage 
providers to locate to those areas, CON regulations appear to restrict access by preventing 
the development of new facilities (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).  In addition, the 
relationship between CON regulations and access varies by service and by state, with no 
ongoing mechanism to monitor access (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).   
 Finally, while some states are more likely to grant a CON to facilities offering more 
charity care, the CON regulations in Washington and most other states do not include 
monitoring for compliance.  No studies were identified that measured the effect of CON 
regulations on levels of charity care, while the study reported that financial and market 
pressures make it increasingly difficult for all types of providers to offer charity care (State 
of Washington JLARC, 1999).   
 The study determined that the available evidence did not support making a 
recommendation as to whether Washington should repeal or retain its CON regulations.  
However, the study did provide specific options for policy makers depending on their 
decision as to the CON regulations‘ future.  Should Washington decide to reform the 
program, the study suggested reassessing legislative and regulatory goals in relation to new 
conditions and needs in healthcare system; establishing policy oversight or an advisory 
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board to make CON regulations more responsive to changes in the healthcare system; and 
improving data collection to allow for ongoing monitoring and oversight of quality, access, 
and community benefits, including charity care (State of Washington JLARC, 1999).  
Should the program be repealed, the study suggested identifying policy goals for cost, 
quality, access and accountability along with alternative methods of attaining these goals; 
strengthening data collection and reporting to monitor the effects of repeal on quality, 
access and community benefits; and conducting economic analysis to estimate the effects 
of deregulation and to guide the policy changes (State of Washington JLARC, 1999). 
 An empirical study by Conover and Sloan (1998) examined health spending 
between the late 1970s and 1993, including spending prior to and directly after state CON 
regulations were repealed, stated: 
The major findings about CON regulations can be summarized as follows: first, we 
found no surge in expenditures after CON regulations were lifted; second, despite a 
statistically significant reduction by mature programs on acute spending per capita, 
there was no corresponding reduction in total per capita spending (apparently due 
to offsetting expenditures on non-hospital services).  We found that mature CON 
regulations reduced hospital bed supply per capita population, but could detect no 
increase in bed supply following the removal of CON (p. 474).   
Furthermore, the study found that established CON regulations increased cost per adjusted 
patient day and also cost per admission (Conover & Sloan, 1998). 
 The only way in which research indicates CON regulations might generate cost 
savings is through lowering the number of procedures.  Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin, and 
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Rosenthal (2006) and Ho (2004) all found that states with CON regulations have lower 
coronary procedure rates for patients with cardiac problems.  The authors suggested that 
this is because fewer providers are certified to perform such procedures, relative to states 
without CON regulations.  However, the difference in procedure rates is slight; suggesting 
both that the effects of supplier-induced demand for these services and the potential benefit 
of cost savings is small. 
 In a 2002 study of CON regulatory policy, hospital financial and utilization data for 
states with CON regulations and states without CON regulations were analyzed for the 
years 1989, 1994, and 1999 (Cimasi, 2002).  The study fell within the parameters of CON 
theory, which asserts that the management and implementation of CON regulations on 
inpatient care supply should reduce the cost of care.  The objectives of the study were to:  
(a) describe characteristics of the U.S. healthcare system, stratified by the CON policy; and 
(b) compare inpatient costs, utilization, and capital indicators between states with and 
without CON regulations. 
 Case definitions for the 2002 HCC CON Regulations study included: the term 
―CON state,‖ which was any state that had acute care CON regulations in effect during the 
analysis period years 1989 through 1999; the term ―non-CON state,‖ which was any state 
that did not have acute care CON regulations in effect during the analysis period years 
1989 through 1999; the term ―included states,‖ defined as the 47 states and the District of 
Columbia, whose status related to whether CON regulations were in effect did not change 
during the analysis period years 1989 through 1999; and, the term ―excluded states,‖ which 
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referred to the states of Indiana, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania, which were excluded 
because of significant changes to their CON regulations between 1989 and 1999. 
 The methodology for the 2002 HCC CON study was based on a statistical analysis, 
employing a one-way analysis of variation (ANOVA), comparing each of the study 
variables, i.e.: beds per 1,000; admissions per 1,000; average length of stay (ALOS); 
expenses per admission; expenses per capita; cost per 1,000; total profit margins; average 
age of plant; and debt per bed, by state CON law status, across three points in time—1989, 
1994, and 1999.  Confidence p-values were calculated for each variable for each variable 
pair (CON regulations and no CON regulations) for each year.  A standard statistical 
significance cut-off of .05 was utilized. 
 Data selected and analyzed for the 2002 HCC CON Study was derived from three 
(3) recognized sources, i.e.: (a) Hospital Statistics published by the American Hospital 
Association (AHA), which compiles hospital data derived from replies to the AHA Annual 
Survey, sent to all AHA-registered and non-registered hospitals in the U.S.; (b) The 
Almanac of Hospital Financial and Operating Indicators, published by The Center for 
Healthcare Industry Performance Studies (CHIPS), which annually reports the financial 
position of the hospital industry; and (c) The Comparative Performance of U.S. Hospitals: 
The Sourcebook, published and produced by Healthcare Investment Analysts (HCIA) and 
Deloitte & Touche, which presents current and historical information on the financial 
performance of the U.S. hospital industry. 
 Several limitations of the 2002 HCC CON Study were disclosed:  
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 (a) the complexity of the healthcare economy, subject to the impact of multiple 
variables, complicates efforts to isolate CON regulations as the driving variable in 
the analysis of health system costs, utilization, or access amid market forces such as 
the impact of government policy and managed care on reimbursements; evolving 
technology, and, shifting patient population demographics and expectations;  
 (b) CON is not a ‗Yes/No‘ variable because states subject to CON regulations are 
also subject to other significant variations including facilities and services 
regulated; CON geographic market definitions; CON review thresholds and 
criteria; demographic and epidemiological characteristics; and CON administrative 
processes; and,  
 (c) the accuracy, validity, and efficacy of the study‘s statistical analysis was 
dependent upon the accuracy, validity, and scope of the reported data utilized (p. 
24). 
 Among the several conclusions drawn from the 2002 HCC CON Study Analysis, 
based on comparing data from states with CON and states with no CON regulations during 
the analysis period years of 1989, 1994, and 1999, was that:   
 (a) the data examined indicated that CON regulations do not reduce beds   
 per 1,000; admissions per 1,000; ALOS, expenses per admission; or   
 expenses per capita;  
(b) there is no evidence that states with CON regulations have achieved greater 
total profit margins at less cost per 1,000;  
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 (c) there is no statistically significant evidence that states with CON regulations 
have achieved a lower average age of land as an indicator of acceleration in new 
construction activity or retirement of existing, aging facilities; and  
 (d) there is statistically significant evidence that states with CON regulations have 
 higher debit per bed than states without CON regulations in 1999 as an indicator of 
 increased cost due to debt load. (p. 32) 
 CON regulations proponents have cited assertions by the ―big three automakers‖, 
that the employee healthcare costs for these automobiles are less on states with CON 
regulations than in states without CON regulations where they operate (Missouri Health 
Facilities Review Committee, 2004).  These purported results have been provided in 
legislative hearings on CON regulations in Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio (Hawkins, 2004).  
Nonetheless, CON regulations proponents have not yet published or otherwise submitted 
the underlying empirical data or methodology for peer review (Hawkins, 2004).  From the 
information that has been made publicly available on the Missouri CON website, these 
studies include the following characteristics, some of which have been challenged by CON 
regulations opponents.  Only eight states are sampled: three of which are states without 
CON regulations (Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana) and five states with CON regulations 
(Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Michigan, and New York).  The survey data was limited 
to healthcare expenses for employees of automakers which may not be representative of 
the total healthcare expenses in these states. 
 As a review of the automakers‘ claims, Health Capital Consultants (HCC) 
evaluated a data sample that includes hospital expenses per capita for states with CON 
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regulations as compared to states without CON regulations, and also selected states with 
CON regulations and states without CON regulations including all of the states included in 
the automakers‘ study.  The results of the HCC analysis indicated that hospital expenses 
per capita for states without CON regulations are considerable less than hospital expenses 
per capita for states with CON regulations.  Furthermore, hospital expenses per capita for 
all of the five (5) states with CON regulations selected in the automakers‘ study, were 
higher than in states without CON regulations overall (HCC, 2002). 
 
Volume and Quality 
 CON regulations are intended to ensure that providers maintain high volume by 
limiting the number of service providers.  More than 100 studies have established a strong 
relationship between higher provider procedure volume and better outcomes (Conover & 
Sloan, 1998).  Luft, Bunker, and Enthoven conducted the pioneering study noting this link 
in 1979.  After another decade of research, Luft et al. (1990) reviewed the literature and 
concluded that there was a link between volume and quality.  Later studies have supported 
the hypothesis that provider volume is negatively associated with mortality and other 
negative outcomes for a variety of cancer resections (Birkmeyer et al. 2002; Ho, 2004; Ho 
et al., 2006; Schrag et al. 2003) and coronary procedures (Birkmeyer et al., 2003; Hannan 
et al., 1998).  Whether the relationship is stronger for hospital or surgeon volume is 
unclear, although Birkmeyer et al. (2003) found that surgeon volume accounts for a 
substantial proportion of hospital volume‘s effect on mortality.  However, Shahian (2004), 
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noted that surgeon data may not be a reliable indicator of quality because, unlike hospitals, 
surgeons can choose to operate on less difficult cases. 
 The literature indicates that the presence of CON regulations influences volume, 
but not always in a way that also improves outcomes.  Di Sesa et al. (2006) found that 
states with CON regulations have higher hospital volumes but not better outcomes for 
coronary artery bypass grafting.  They used the Society of Thoracic Surgeons‘ (STS) 
National Cardiac Surgery Database to examine isolated CABG surgery volume, operative 
mortality, and complications for the years 2000 to 2003.  The presence of CON regulations 
for open heart surgery was ascertained for each state in this study.  Results were analyzed 
nationally, by state, and by region (West, Northeast, Midwest, South) and were adjusted 
for clinical factors and both population density and region with mixed-effects hierarchical 
logistic regression models.  From 2000 to 2003, 314,710 isolated CABG surgeries were 
performed at 294 STS hospitals in states with CON regulations (n=27, including 
Washington, DC) and 280,512 procedures at 343 STS hospitals in states without CON 
regulations (n=24).  Patient clinical characteristics were similar among states with CON 
regulations and states without CON regulations.  States with CON regulations tended to 
have higher population densities and had significantly higher median hospital annual 
CABG volumes in each year from 2000 to 2003 (p < 0.005).  This difference remained 
significant after adjustment for region and population density.  Operative mortality was 
2.52% for states with CON regulations versus 2.62% for states without CON regulations  
(p = 0.32).  There was a significant association between CON regulations and operative 
mortality in the South.  After adjustment for patient risk factors and region, there was a 
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marginally significant reduction of mortality risk in states with CON regulations (adjusted 
OR 0.92, 95% CI 0.86 to 1.00).  However, this difference was not statistically significant 
when a revised model accounted for random state effects.  Similar volume and outcomes 
results were seen when the analysis was repeated with data from Medicare database.   
 Supporting this finding, Ho (2004) and Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin, and Rosenthal 
(2006) concluded that states with CON regulations have higher hospital cardiac procedure 
volumes but not better outcomes, compared to states without CON regulations.  Ho (2004) 
studied data from the AHRQ Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) database to compare 
hospital procedure volumes and costs for PTCA and CABG in states with and without 
cardiac CON regulations.  The NIS contains patient-level clinical and resource use 
information and the data was analyzed for the years 1988 to 2000.  Regression estimates 
were used for the determinants of hospital PTCA and CAGB procedure volume and 
mortality.  The conclusions for this study suggest that substantial declines in average 
hospital PTCA and CABG procedure volume have resulted in states which repealed 
cardiac CON regulations.  Reductions in average hospital volume associated with the 
absence of CON regulations have a detrimental impact on mortality rates for CABG 
patients.  For the 29,294 patients who received CABG surgeries in states that have 
repealed CON regulations in 2000, the results suggest that 29 fewer inpatient deaths could 
have been avoided with CON regulations.  In addition, the results yield no evidence that 
the volume effects associated with CON regulations led to reduced mortality for patients 
undergoing PTCA. 
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 A retrospective cohort study of 1,139,792 Medicare patients aged 68 years and 
older with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) who was admitted to 4,587 U.S. hospitals 
during 2000 to 2003 was performed by Popescu et al. (2006).  Their findings were that 
patients in states with CON regulations were less likely to be admitted to hospitals with 
coronary revascularization services (321,573 {51.5%] vs. 323,695 [62.8%]; p < .001) or to 
undergo revascularization at the admitting hospital (163,120 [26.1%] vs. 163,877 [31.8%]; 
p < .001) than patients in states without CON regulations but were more likely to undergo 
revascularization at a transfer hospital (73,379 [11.7%] vs. 45,907 [8.9%]; p < .001.  They 
concluded that patients with acute myocardial infarction were less likely to be admitted to 
hospitals offering coronary revascularization and to undergo early revascularization in 
states with certificate of need regulations.  However, differences in the availability and use 
of revascularization therapies were not associated with mortality. 
 Shortell and Hughes (1988) found that states that have CON regulations, rate-
setting programs, or high HMO penetration actually have higher mortality, but their study 
has not been replicated.  They examined the influence of the regulation of hospital rates, 
state CON regulations, competition, and hospital ownership on mortality rates among 
inpatients receiving care under Medicare.  Data were obtained from the records of 214,839 
patients who received care in 981 hospitals in 45 states from 1983 to 1984.  They found 
significant associations between higher mortality rates among inpatients and the stringency 
of state programs to review hospital rates (p < 0.05), and the intensity of competition in the 
marketplace, as measured by enrollment in health maintenance organizations (p < 0.05).  
They found hospitals in the states with the most stringent procedures for reviewing 
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applications for certificate of need had ratios of actual to predicted death rates that were 5 
to 6% higher than those of hospitals in states with less stringent CON regulations (p < 
0.05).   
 Another study by Ross et al. (2007) was conducted to examine whether rates of 
appropriate catheterization after admission for acute myocardial infarction varied between 
states with and without CON regulations of cardiac catheterization.  Their hypothesis was 
that CON regulations would be associated with lower rates of catheterization among 
patients with equivocal and weak indications but equal or higher rates among those with 
strong indications.  This study performed a retrospective analysis of chart-abstracted data 
for 137,279 Medicare patients admitted for acute myocardial infarction between 1994 and 
1996 at 4,179 US acute-care hospitals.  Using 3-level hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling adjusted for patient sociodemographic and clinical characteristics and physician 
and hospital characteristics, they compared catheterization rates within 60 days of 
admission for states (and the District of Columbia) with (n=32) and without (n=19) CON 
regulations in the full cohort and stratified by catheterization appropriateness.  They found 
that CON regulations were associated with a borderline-significant lower rate of 
catheterization overall (45.8% versus 46.5%; adjusted risk ratio [RR] 0.91, 95% 
confidence interval 0.82 to 1.00, p = 0.06).  After stratification by appropriateness, CON 
regulations were not associated with a significantly lower rate of catheterization among 
68,823 patients with strong indications (49.9% versus 50.3%; adjusted RR 0.94, 95% 
confidence interval 0.86 to 1.02, p = 0.17).  However, CON regulations were associated 
with significantly lower rates of catheterization among 65,077 patients with equivocal 
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indication (45.0% versus 46.0%; adjusted RR 0.88, 95% confidence interval 0.78 to 1.00, p 
= 0.05) and among 8,379 patients with weak indications (19.8% versus 21.8%; adjusted 
RR 0.84, 95% confidence interval 0.71 to 0.98, p = 0.04).  
 Researchers consistently find that when controlling for volume and case severity, 
specialty and for-profit hospitals do not have better outcomes than general hospitals.  The 
GAO (2003) concluded that specialty hospitals see patients who are less ill, a finding that 
has been confirmed by Winter (2003) and Mitchell (2005).  Specialty hospitals‘ larger 
share of less-severe cases appears to influence their outcome data.  In a study of coronary 
artery bypass grafting (CABG), Cram, Rosenthal, and Vaughan-Sarrazin (2005) found that 
outcomes do not differ between specialty and general hospitals, controlling for volume and 
case severity.  The ownership of a hospital – another potential difference between general 
and specialty hospitals – appears to have no bearing on outcomes, cost, or efficiency 
(Shortell & Hughes, 1988; Sloan et al., 2001). 
 Luft, Bunker and Enthoven  (1979) were the first to suggest a relationship between 
procedural volume and outcome.
 
 Since that time, many studies have supported their 
results.  However, a consensus about the significance of high volume and its association 
with lower in-hospital mortality still does not exist and the use of volume as a ―quality 
indicator‖ continues to be debated (Birkmeyer, 2003; Halm et al., 2000).  Despite the lack 
of agreement, many policymakers and some physicians advocate the use of volume as an 
indicator of quality and as the basis for such policies as selective patient referral. 
 Research by Birkmeyer et al. (2002) was undertaken to be the definitive study of 
the relationship between volume and outcome.  Using information from the national 
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Medicare claims database and the Nationwide Inpatient Sample, they examined the 
mortality associated with six types of cardiovascular procedures and eight types of major 
cancer resections between 1994 and 1999 (total number of procedures in the sample was 
2.5 million).  Regression analysis was used to determine the relationship between hospital 
volume (total number of procedures performed per year) and mortality (in-hospital or 
within 30 days), with adjustments for characteristics of the patients.  Mortality decreased 
as volume increased for all 14 types of procedures, but the relative importance of volume 
varied markedly according to the type of procedure.  Absolute differences in adjusted 
mortality rates between very-low-volume hospitals and very-high-volume hospitals ranged 
from over 12% (for pancreatic resection, 16.3% vs. 3.8 %) to only 0.2% (for carotid 
endarterectomy, 1.7% vs. 1.5 %).  They concluded that in the absence of other information 
about the quality of surgery at the hospitals near them, Medicare patients undergoing 
selected cardiovascular or cancer procedures can significantly reduce their risk of operative 
death by selecting a high-volume hospital (Birkmeyer et al, 2002). 
 The Leapfrog Group, a consortium of healthcare purchasers and providers 
representing approximately 33 million patients and $56 billion in healthcare revenue, is 
perhaps the best-known promoter of volume-based selective referrals (Birkmeyer et al., 
2002).
 
 The Leapfrog Initiative plans to use market forces to promote improvement in the 
quality of healthcare.  One of its initial guidelines calls for selective referral to high-
volume hospitals for five invasive procedures, and for high-risk neonatal care.  The annual 
volume thresholds were set at 500 coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedures per 
year, 400 coronary angioplasties, 30 abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repairs, 100 
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carotid endarterectomies (CEA), and 7 esophagectomies (Hannan, Popp & Tranmer, 1998).  
The Leapfrog Group based these thresholds on expert opinion and a critical review of the 
literature.
 
 Several of these studies used geographically limited databases with few high-
volume institutions and may not be generalizable (Sollano & Moskowitz, 1999; Khuri, 
Daley & Henderson, 1999).  More importantly, these analyses were not intended to 
determine thresholds but were primarily designed to validate the existence of volume-
outcome correlations.  Finally, more recent studies of the same populations failed to show 
a relationship between volume and mortality for two of these procedures, AAA and 
CABG.  The Leapfrog Group revised its suggested volume thresholds in April 2003, 
removing CEA from the list of procedures and adding major pancreatic resections. In 
addition, they altered the thresholds for the remaining three procedures (450 CABG, 50 
AAA, and 13 esophagectomies).  This amendment illustrates that despite the consistent 
evidence of a relationship between volume and outcome in the literature, it is still not clear 
how to proceed to policy changes.
 
 Although selective referral may be a viable option, it is 
still not clear where the threshold should be set and if a single threshold is even reasonable. 
 The relationship between volume and outcome is likely a proxy for other structural 
and process components of care, which more accurately predicts quality than volume 
alone.  Many of these suggested structural and process characteristics, such as the presence 
of house staff or more specialized attending staff, dedicated operating rooms, or better 
nurse staffing, are more prevalent in academic institutions.  The importance of process 
measures has been recognized by the Leapfrog Group, which recently proposed a set of 
process measures for each of its index procedures to be used as an adjunct to volume; 
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however, until these process measures are better defined and institutions are able to 
document their performance based on these indicators, volume will continue to be used in 
quality measurement. 
 Khuri et al. (1998) failed to show a relationship between surgical volume and 
outcome using the Veterans Affairs National Surgical Quality Improvement Program 
database (VA NSQIP).
 
 This large, multi-institutional national database (includes 68,631 
operations from 123 institutions between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 1997) was 
used to investigate eight common surgical procedures and failed to find a relationship 
between volume and outcome for any of them.  This study included prospective 
assessment of presurgical risk factors, process of care during surgery, and outcomes 30 
days after surgery; development of multivariable risk-adjustment models; identification of 
high and low outlier facilities by observed-to-expected outcome ratios; and generation of 
annual reports of comparative outcomes to all surgical services in the Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA).   
 Thiemann et al. (1999) conducted a retrospective cohort study of the relation 
between the number of Medicare patients with myocardial infarction that each hospital in 
the study treated (hospital volume) and long-term survival among 98,898 Medicare 
patients 65 years of age or older.  They used proportional-hazards methods to adjust for 
clinical, demographic, and health-system-related variables, including the availability of 
invasive procedures, the specialty of the attending physician, and the general area of 
residence of the patient (rural, urban, or metropolitan).  They concluded that patients with 
acute myocardial infarction who are admitted directly to hospitals that have more 
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experience treating myocardial infarction, as reflected by their case volume, are more 
likely to survive than are patients admitted to low-volume hospitals. 
 Although Thiemann et al. (1999) reported a significant relation between hospital 
volume and mortality in the case of acute myocardial infarction, the findings of another 
study (Chen et al. 1999) suggested that the relation between volume and mortality may be 
related to differences in the processes of care.  Using the same database but not all the 
same patients or hospital groupings, Chen at al. (1999) found that one group of high-
volume hospitals (those included on the list of ―America‘s Best Hospitals,‖ published 
annually by U.S. News & World Report, 1997) had significantly lower rates of 30-day 
mortality than did two other groups of hospitals.  One of the other groups consisted of 
high-volume hospitals that had on-site facilities for cardiac catheterization, angioplasty, 
and coronary-artery bypass graft surgery, and the other group was composed of mostly 
low-volume hospitals that did not have these facilities.  The differences in mortality rates 
were no longer significant after adjustment for the higher use of aspirin and beta-blockers 
in hospitals listed in ―America‘s Best Hospitals.‖ 
 
Summary 
 CON regulations emerged during 1970s as a response to a federal mandate 
introduced by the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA) 
and to healthcare cost containment concerns associated with cost-based reimbursement 
methodologies.  In today‘s environment, none of these original reasons seem to have 
validity as they did three decades ago.  In 1988, when NHPRDA expired, CON regulations 
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were no longer federally mandated.  Also, the trend toward service-based payment 
methodologies coupled with expansion of managed care significantly mitigated the 
original cost containment concerns that existed when cost-based payment methodologies 
were being used.   
 There is limited literature on CON regulations effects on volume and quality.  Most 
studies conclude that the absence of CON regulations do not necessarily lead to more 
services, abandonment of cities or charity care, or to a proliferation of for-profit hospitals.  
High procedural volume has been strongly associated with better outcomes but the 
literature indicates that the presence of CON regulations impacts volume, but not in a way 
that improves outcomes.  Lastly, most of the evidence suggests that CON regulations 
neither substantially reduce nor contain healthcare expenditures.  Solid organ 
transplantation is a complex, high-cost treatment that in 2008 was performed over 27,000 
times.  However, none of the published studies have examined the association of CON 
regulation on volumes and outcomes for solid organ transplants.   
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Following the overview and development of the Certificate of Need (CON) 
regulations and the review of the literature, this study examines the regulation and its 
impact on heart and kidney transplant centers.  Historically, CON was meant to regulate 
cost, quality, and access to healthcare services.  The objectives of this study are to 
understand the association of CON regulations on number of centers, volume and 
outcomes of transplant centers in states with and without solid organ transplant CON 
regulations.  This chapter provides a detailed account of the study design, hypotheses, and 
the study population; it also defines and describes the variable used in this study.  As 
previously discussed, this study tests the relationships between CON regulation the number 
of centers per state, transplant volume and quality indicators (graft and patient failure). 
 The study assesses the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations using 
a clinically-rich database available from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients 
(SRTR).  The study will answer the question: What is the association of solid organ 
transplant CON regulations on the number of centers, the transplant volume and outcomes 
for  heart and kidney transplant centers?  
 
Data Source 
 The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) is the unified 
transplant network established by Congress under the National Organ Transplant Act 
(NOTA) of 1984 to be operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal 
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contract.  The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) was awarded the first OPTN 
contract on September 30, 1986, and has continued to administer the OPTN under contract 
with the Health Resources and Services Administration of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) for more than 20 years and four successive contract renewals.  
The OPTN is a public-private partnership that links all of the professionals involved in the 
donation and transplantation system. The goals of the OPTN are to: 
 increase and ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of organ sharing in the 
national system of organ allocation.  
 increase the supply of donated organs available for transplantation.  
―As part of the OPTN contract, UNOS has: 
 established an organ sharing system that maximizes the efficient use of organs 
through fair and timely allocation.  
 established a system for the collection, storage, analysis and publication of data 
pertaining to the patient waiting list, organ matching, and transplants.  
 provided information, consultation and guidance to persons and organizations 
concerned with human organ transplantation in order to increase the number of 
organs available for transplantation.‖  ( UNOS, 2010)  
 UNOS members include transplant hospitals, organ procurement organizations and 
independent histocompatibility laboratories in the United States, as well as voluntary 
health organizations, such as the American Diabetes Association; ethicists and families of 
donors; and medical professional and scientific organizations, such as the American 
Medical Association. ―Membership means that upon completion of the prescribed 
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application process and satisfaction of applicable requirements, the organization or 
individual has demonstrated compliance with all applicable UNOS membership criteria.‖ 
(UNOS, 2010)  
 Representing the largest group of UNOS membership, transplant centers are the 
medical institutions that operate organ transplant programs.  As of October 11, 2009, 250 
transplant centers in the United States were operating one or more organ transplant 
programs.  Transplant centers are required to submit data to  at the time of recipient 
registration include transplant center information, recipient demographics, organ type 
transplanted (heart, lung, or heart-lung combination), patient description, pre-transplant 
serology, and factors that increase the patient's risk for a poor transplant outcome. 
 Kidney data collected on the Transplant Recipient Registration Form include 
transplant date, patient status (at time of transplant), primary renal diagnosis, pre-transplant 
serology, organ preservation description, and surgical information.  Additional data 
collected as part of the Transplant Recipient Follow-Up Form include patient status (at 
time of follow-up), information about organ rejection, immunosuppressive medication, 
graft status, cause of graft loss, patient status, and cause of death (OPTN, 2010). 
Thoracic data collected at the time of recipient registration include transplant center 
information, recipient demographics, organ type transplanted (heart, lung, or heart-lung 
combination), patient description, pre-transplant serology, and factors that increase the 
patient's risk for a poor transplant outcome.  This data is submitted to The Scientific 
Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) is a national database of statistics related to 
solid organ transplantation (kidney, liver, pancreas, intestine, heart, and lung).  The 
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Registry covers the full range of transplant activity, from organ donation and waiting list 
candidates to transplant recipients and survival statistics.  The purpose of the Registry is to 
support the development of sound policy, to encourage research on issues of importance to 
the transplant community, and to facilitate responsible analysis of transplant programs and 
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs). 
  Data in the Registry are collected by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network (OPTN) from transplant centers and organ procurement organizations (OPOs) 
across the country.  Transplant centers are medical institutions within the United States 
that operate an organ transplant program.  The database captures clinical information from 
transplant centers.  Centers enter patient data using uniform definitions.  A series of quality 
checks are performed before a site‘s data are aggregated into the national sample.  The 
SRTR is administered by the Arbor Research Collaborative for Health with the University 
of Michigan. 
 
Patient Population 
 Data from the SRTR for 309 transplant centers (101 heart transplant centers and 
208 kidney transplant centers) from 2006 through 2008 will be examined.  Volume of 
transplants performed per center as well as their risk-adjusted graft failure and patient 
deaths will provide the variables of interest. 
 Information about states‘ CON regulations was obtained from the 2006 and 2008 
annual reports published by the National Directory of the American Health Policy 
Association.   
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Variables 
 The independent variable for the study is the presence or absence of solid organ 
transplantation CON regulations within a state.  For transplant-center level analyses, the 
outcome variables of interest were graft failure and patient death as measured by the risk-
adjusted observed to expect graft failure ration and observed to expected patient death ratio 
report through SRTR for each transplant center.  For state-level analyses, the outcome 
variable of interest were the number of transplant centers, the average transplant center 
volume and the total number of transplant procedures performed during the study period in 
a given state.    
 Graft failure is reported by SRTR at the 1-month, 1-year, and 3-year reporting 
time points for each center, with corresponding rates for the U.S.  This study uses the 1-
year data.  For the 1-year statistics, transplants occurring between January 1, 2006 and 
December 31, 2008 were included.  Statistics reported by SRTR for adults (age 18 and 
older) were used.  Additional data from the Social Security Death Master File (SSDMF) 
and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) were incorporated by SRTR  into 
the graft survival rates.  
 Graft failure is defined differently for different organs. For all organs, deaths are 
considered to be graft failures.  Once the patient has died, it cannot be determined how 
long the graft would have functioned had the patient lived.  The SSDMF and CMS data are 
used in conjunction with OPTN data to identify deaths.  In the case of conflicting deaths 
dates from various sources, the OPTN death date takes precedence.  If there is no OPTN 
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death date but conflicting dates from SSDMF and CMS, the SSDMF date takes 
precedence.  
 A graft is considered to have failed when follow-up information indicates that one 
of the following occurred prior to the reporting time point: graft failure (except for heart 
and liver where retransplant dates are used instead), retransplant, or death. OPTN follow-
up forms are used to identify graft failure and retransplant dates.  Transplants that occurred 
in the last six months of the accrual period for the 1-year reporting time point are only 
followed for six months after transplant because the 1-year follow-up information is not 
available in the current OPTN data. The reporting time point for this subset of transplants 
is six months after transplantation.  
 The ―Expected Graft Failure‖ is the fraction of grafts that would be expected to fail 
at each reported time point, based on the national experience for patients similar to those at 
this center.  The national experience was analyzed using data for all grafts at all facilities in 
the United States.  A Cox proportional hazards regression model for time to graft failure 
(Cox, 1972) was fitted to the national data, which yielded the probability of graft failure 
for each patient, based upon the characteristics of each patient and the reporting time point.  
The expected survival is the average of these computed probabilities.  The characteristics 
accounted for in these calculations are reported by SRTR in their model description.  
Models are fit separately by age group (adult and pediatric) and cohort (1-month/1-year 
and 3-year).  For kidney and liver transplants, models are also fit separately for living and 
deceased donor transplants.  The ―Expected Graft Failure‖ for each organ was adjusted for 
the patient characteristics as listed in the Risk-Adjustment Models.  
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 Patient death is reported by SRTR at the 1-month, 1-year, and 3-year reporting 
time points for each center, with corresponding rates for the U.S.  Only those transplants 
that occurred between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2008 were eligible for inclusion 
in the analyses. Patients who had previously received a transplant of this type, whether this 
previous transplant occurred during the accrual period or not, were not included.  For this 
reason, the eligible procedures for inclusion may be smaller than the transplant count used 
in the volume model.  Statistics were used for adults (age 18 and older).  SRTR used 
additional data from the SSDMF CMS for inclusion in the patient death rates.  
 The SSDMF and CMS data are used in conjunction with OPTN data to determine 
whether each patient is alive or dead at the end of the follow-up period.  A patient is 
counted as having died when OPTN follow-up information, SSDMF data, or CMS data 
indicates that a death has occurred prior to the reporting time point.  In the case of 
conflicting deaths dates from various sources, the OPTN death date takes precedence.  If 
there is no OPTN death date but conflicting dates from SSDMF and CMS, the SSDMF 
date takes precedence.  If the patient is not reported to have died in any source, the patient 
is assumed to be alive.  
  The national experience was analyzed using data for all accrued transplants at all 
facilities in the United States.  A Cox proportional hazards regression model for time to 
death (Cox, 1972) was fitted to the national data, which yielded the probability of survival 
to the reporting time point for each patient, based upon the characteristics of each patient 
and the reporting time point.  The expected death is the average of these computed 
probabilities. The characteristics accounted for in these calculations are reported by SRTR 
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in their model description.  Models are fit separately by age group (adult and pediatric) and 
cohort (1-month/1-year and 3-year). For kidney and liver transplants, models are also fit 
separately for living and deceased donor transplants.  The ―Expected Patient Death‖ for 
each organ was adjusted for the patient characteristics as listed in the SRTR Risk-
Adjustment Models. For statistical comparisons, it is appropriate to compare the number of 
deaths observed during follow-up (which is shorter than the reporting time point for 
censored patients) to the number of deaths that would be expected during follow-up, rather 
than by comparison of observed and expected survival rates at the reporting time points. 
The ratio of observed to expected deaths compares the entire survival curve up to the 
reporting time point to the curve expected for patients with the same characteristics based 
on the national experience rather than just the survival at the reporting time point. A ratio 
greater than 1.00 indicates that there were more deaths at the center than would have been 
expected based on the national experience, while a ratio less than 1.00 indicates that there 
were fewer deaths at the center than would have been expected based on the national 
experience. For example, a ratio of 1.20 indicates that the death rate at the center was, on 
average, 20% higher than the national rate. A ratio of 1.00 indicates that the death rates at 
the center are the same as the national death rates. 
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Hypotheses 
 
This study will be a non-experimental, descriptive and correlational research 
design.   
Based on the objective to examine CON regulations on heart and kidney transplant centers, 
the following hypotheses are proposed: 
1. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will have fewer 
transplant centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
2. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will perform more 
heart and kidney transplant procedures than states without CON regulation for solid 
organ transplant services. 
3. States with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services will have better 
quality outcomes (graft failures and patient deaths) than states without CON 
regulation for solid organ transplant services. 
As the healthcare environment has changed over time from cost-based 
reimbursement to capitation and fixed fees for service, CON regulations effectiveness 
should be critically examined.  Heart and kidney transplantation are complex 
procedures that have been regulated by CON but never studied for volume differences 
or improved outcomes. 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 This chapter will outline the results of the study of 309 transplant centers during the 
years 2006 through 2008.  First, a descriptive analysis of the data will be presented.  Then 
the results of the independent samples t-test and univariate analysis of variance for each 
hypothesis will be presented. 
 
Descriptive Analysis – States 
   Currently 37 states and the District of Columbia (DC) have a CON regulation and 
of those 37, 21 have a specific solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Fourteen (14) states 
have no CON regulation and 30 states have no solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
 
Figure 1.  States with CON regulations compared to States with Transplant CON   
                 Regulations 
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Table 1.  States with CON Regulations and States with Transplant CON Regulations 
             
   
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive Analysis – Transplant Centers 
 Active transplant centers (performed at least 1 transplant procedure each year for 
2006, 2007 and 2008) for adult heart and kidney transplants numbered 309 for the 50 
United States including the District of Columbia.  The number of transplant centers per 
state ranged from 0 to 30 (Table 3).  Four states have no transplant centers: Alaska, Idaho, 
Montana and Wyoming. 
 
Figure 2.  Number of Heart and Kidney Transplant Centers by Transplant CON 
 
Organ Transplant CON? 
 Frequency Percent 
  Yes 21 41.2 
No 30 58.8 
Total 51 100.0 
State CON? 
 Frequency Percent 
        Yes 37 72.5 
No 14 27.5 
Total 51 100.0 
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Table 2.  Transplant Centers by Transplant CON and Organ 
 
Organ Transplant CON? 
Total Yes No 
Organ Heart Count 42 59 101 
% within Organ 41.6% 58.4% 100.0% 
Kidney Count 84 124 208 
% within Organ 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 126 183 309 
% within Organ 40.8% 59.2% 100.0% 
  
In 96 hospitals, both heart and kidney transplant were performed; in 213 hospitals 
only one type of transplant was performed – either heart or kidney.  For the purpose of this 
study, centers are counted separately even when a hospital performs both type of 
transplants (heart and kidney).  Typically, there are different transplant surgeons and 
nursing staffs caring for the different organ types. 
 
Hypothesis # 1 - Transplant Centers Analysis 
 One purpose of CON regulations is to limit the number of providers or services in 
order to prevent duplication of services.  The first hypothesis of this study proposes that 
states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services will have fewer heart and 
kidney transplant centers than a state without a CON regulation for solid organ transplant 
services.  The null hypothesis is that there are no differences or more transplant centers in 
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states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than states without a CON regulation 
for solid organ transplants.   
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located was used and the 
number of transplant centers per state was tested.  Table 3 shows the results and as 
expected states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer transplant centers 
(126 versus 183).  A difference in the mean number of transplant centers per state was 
identified.  States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had 4.94 fewer transplant 
centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 3. Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 13.03 10.10 15.04 
Median 11.00 10.00 11.00 
Standard Deviation 9.335 5.275 10.877 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 30 20 30 
Skewness .699 .573 .283 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis -.929 -.265 -1.657 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
 In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 3 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  Histogram Transplant Centers per State 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.  Figure 4 illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the mean number of transplant centers in the states with and without a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 5 provides results from the independent t-test and 
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is not equal variance in both groups  
(p = .000) and the t (306) = -2.397, p = .017.  This analysis found that as hypothesized 
states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had fewer transplant 
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
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Table 4. Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean of Log .9847 .9289 1.0230 
Median of Log 1.0413 1.0000 1.0414 
Standard Deviation of Log .3623 .2891 .4014 
Minimum of Log .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum of Log 1.4771 1.3010 1.4771 
Skewness of Log -.463 -1.297 -.387 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis of Log -.222 2.414 -.988 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .276 .428 .357 
 
 
Figure 4.  Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State 
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Table 5.  T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State 
 Transplant Centers per State 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
38.362 
.000 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-2.260 
307 
.025 
-.0942 
.0417 
 
 
-.1761 
-.0122 
-2.397 
306.358 
.017 
-.0942 
.0393 
 
 
-.1715 
-.0169 
  
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 6 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates a significant difference 
[F (1, 307) = 5.108, p = .025] in the mean number of transplant centers in the states with 
and without a solid transplant CON regulation.   
Table 6.  ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Centers per State 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .662 1 .662 5.108 .025 
Within Groups 39.779 307 .130   
Total 40.441 308    
 
 The above analysis is consistent with hypothesis that CON regulations control or 
restrict the total number of centers.  One concern is that this relationship could be an 
artifact of the population of the state.  If states with a solid organ transplant CON 
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regulation are smaller in population size, on average, they may have fewer centers per state 
because population needs would be lower. 
 A first review of the state population size for states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation shows that both groups contain at least some states with large 
populations.  Table 7 shows that of states with populations over 10 million, there are 4 
with a solid organ transplant CON regulation and 4 without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 7.  States with Average Populations greater than 10,000,000 Residents 
State Average Population 
Estimate 
2006-2008 
Current CON 
for Solid 
Organ 
Transplant 
Active Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
 
Active Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
California 36,261,900 No 9 19 
Texas 23,837,005 No 9 21 
New York 19,415,710 Yes 6 14 
Florida 18,263,424 Yes 4 8 
Illinois 12,780,127 Yes 5 7 
Pennsylvania 12,520,014 No 7 14 
Ohio 11,513,794 No 3 8 
 
A better test would control for ―transplant needs‖ in each state in order to evaluate 
if access to transplant centers is restricted in states with a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation relative to states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  As a rough 
proxy for this idea, a test for differences between the numbers of centers per state was 
performed by creating a new variable (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents).  This 
variable was created using the number of transplant centers per state normalized to the 
state average population for 2006 through 2008.  Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics 
for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  
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A difference in the mean number of transplant centers per state was identified but in the 
opposite direction once population was taken into account.  The mean difference was 
0.0132 more centers for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states 
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 8. Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers in 
States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers in 
States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean .1262 .1340 .1208 
Median .1030 .0993 .1259 
Standard Deviation .1013 .1497 .0436 
Minimum .0431 .0431 .0452 
Maximum .8520 .8520 .3131 
Skewness 6.034 4.463 1.144 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 40.782 19.171 3.104 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 8 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.  Histogram Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 9.  Figure 6 illustrates that the transformed variable is 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data 
for transplant centers per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents in 
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 10 provides results 
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal 
variance in both groups (p = .590) and the t (307) = -.847, p = .398.  This analysis found 
that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have fewer transplant 
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  So when normalized 
by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis is not supported.    
   
73 
 
Table 9. Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean of Log -.9521 -.9627 -.9447 
Median of Log -.9872 -1.0031 -.9000 
Standard Deviation of Log .18360 .21976 .15408 
Minimum of Log -1.37 -1.37 -.34 
Maximum of Log -.07 -.07 -.50 
Skewness of Log 1.691 2.573 -.092 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis of Log 7.030 8.790 -.075 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .276 .428 .357 
 
 
Figure 6.  Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
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Table 10.  T-Test Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents  
 Transplant Centers per 
100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.291 
.590 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.847 
307 
.398 
-.01801 
.02126 
 
 
-.05985 
.02383 
-.795 
207.604 
.428 
-.01801 
.02265 
 
 
-.06266 
.02665 
 
 As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
This analysis demonstrates [F (1, 307) = .717, p = .398] that there is no significant 
difference in the mean number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents in the states with 
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
 
Table 11.  ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .024 1 .024 .717 .398 
Within Groups 10.358 307 .034   
Total 10.382 308    
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Type of Transplant 
The next step was to see if a significant difference existed between the two types of 
organ transplants under study – heart and kidney transplants.  Even though the procedures 
are both complex surgical procedures, the process of procurement of the organs are quite 
different between heart and kidney transplants.  Heart transplants are dependent on the 
death of a donor in order to have a heart to use in the transplant procedure.  Kidneys, on 
the other hand, can be procured from deceased donors or from living donors.  Because of 
the extreme differences in procurement, both were analyzed separately to determine if one 
played a larger role or not. 
Table 12 shows the descriptive statistics for heart transplant centers and as expected 
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer heart transplant centers (42 
versus 59).  A difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers per state was 4.62.  
States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had, on average, fewer heart transplant 
centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  
 
Table 12.  Heart Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Heart Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean 12.91 10.21 14.83 
Median 10.00 10.00 11.00 
Standard Deviation 9.100 4.941 10.793 
Minimum 2 2 2 
Maximum 30 20 30 
Skewness .792 .715 .351 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis -.802 .056 -1.668 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .717 .613 
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 12 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 7.  
Figure 7.  Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per State 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 13.  Figure 8 illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for heart transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 14 provides results from the independent t-
test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is not equal variance in both 
groups (p = .000) and the t (96.951) = -1.206, p = .231.  This analysis found that states 
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with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had no fewer heart transplant 
centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
 
Table 13.  Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log .9979 .9552 1.0283 
Median of Log 1.0000 1.0000 1.0414 
Standard Deviation of Log .3248 .2298 .3773 
Minimum of Log .3010 .3010 .3010 
Maximum of Log 1.4771 1.3010 1.4771 
Skewness of Log -.093 -.569 -.171 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log -.843 .344 -1.319 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
 
Figure 8.  Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State 
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Table 14.  T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per Sate  
 Heart Transplant Centers 
per State 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
26.281 
.000 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.116 
99 
.267 
-.0731 
.0655 
 
 
-.2030 
.0569 
-1.206 
96.951 
.231 
-.0731 
.0606 
 
 
-.1933 
.0471 
 
 As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 15 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 99) = 1.245, p = .267] in the mean number of heart transplant centers in 
the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation. 
Table 15.  ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per State 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .131 1 .131 1.245 .267 
Within Groups 10.421 99 .105   
Total 10.552 100    
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For reasons previously discussed, the data was normalized to population by 
creating a new variable: heart transplant centers per 100,000 residents.  Table 16 shows the 
descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  A slight difference in the mean number of heart transplant 
centers per 100,000 residents was identified but in the opposite direction once population 
was taken into account.  The mean difference was 0.006 more centers for states with a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 16. Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Heart Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean .1176 .1211 .1151 
Median .1030 .0993 .1185 
Standard Deviation .0812 .1189 .0368 
Minimum .0431 .0431 .0452 
Maximum .8520 .8520 .1784 
Skewness 7.522 5.923 .107 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis 67.962 37.038 -1.054 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .717 .613 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 20 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 17.  Figure 10 illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for heart transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the mean number of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 18 provides results from the independent t-
test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups  
(p = -.434) and the t (99) = -.510, p = .611.  This analysis found that states with a CON 
regulation for solid organ transplant services had no fewer heart transplant centers than 
those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
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Table 17. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log -.9698 -.9797 -.9627 
Median of Log -.9871 -1.0030 -.9262 
Standard Deviation of Log .1650 .1866 .1491 
Minimum of Log -1.3655 -1.3655 -1.3449 
Maximum of Log -.0696 -.0696 -.7486 
Skewness of Log 1.362 2.751 -.440 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log 7.814 13.624 -.539 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
Figure 10.  Histogram Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
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Table 18.  T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 
Residents 
 Heart Transplant Centers 
per 100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.618 
.434 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.510 
99 
.611 
-.0170 
.0334 
 
 
-.0834 
.0493 
-.491 
75.709 
.625 
-.0170 
.0347 
 
 
-.0862 
.0521 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 19 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference  [F (1, 99) = .260, p = .611] in the mean number of heart transplant centers in 
the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.   
Table 19.  ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .007 1 .007 .260 .611 
Within Groups 2.717 99 .027   
Total 2.724 100    
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To continue testing the first hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of 
a solid organ transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located was 
used and the number of kidney transplant centers per state was tested.  Table 20 shows the 
results and as expected states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had fewer 
kidney transplant centers (84 versus 124).  A difference in the mean number of kidney 
transplant centers per state was identified.  States with a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation had on the average 5.11 fewer kidney transplant centers than states without a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 20.  Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean 13.08 10.04 15.15 
Median 11.00 9.50 11.00 
Standard Deviation 9.468 5.463 10.959 
Minimum 1 1 1 
Maximum 30 20 30 
Skewness .662 .535 .255 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis -.978 -.354 -1.669 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
  
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 20 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Histogram Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 21.  Figure 12 illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for kidney transplant centers per state to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the states with 
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 22 provides results from the 
independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is not equal variance 
in both groups (p = .000) and the t (203.144) = -2.071, p = .040.  This analysis found that 
as hypothesized states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services had fewer 
kidney transplant centers than those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
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Table 21.  Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log .9782 .9157 1.0206 
Median of Log 1.0414 .9771 1.0414 
Standard Deviation of Log .3798 .3151 .4139 
Minimum of Log .0000 .0000 .0000 
Maximum of Log 1.4771 1.3010 1.4771 
Skewness of Log -.558 -1.354 -.462 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log -.153 2.203 -.909 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
 
 
Figure 12.  Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
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Table 22.  T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
 Kidney Transplant Centers 
per State 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
18.858 
.000 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.967 
206 
.051 
-.1048 
.0533 
 
 
-.2099 
-.0002 
-2.071 
203.144 
.040 
-.1048 
.0506 
 
 
-.2047 
-.0050 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 23 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates a significant difference  
[F (1, 206) = 3.870, p = .051] in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the states 
with and without a solid transplant CON regulation. 
Table 23.  ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per State 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .551 1 .551 3.870 .051 
Within Groups 29.311 206 .142   
Total 29.862 207    
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For reasons previously discussed, the data was normalized to population by 
creating a new variable: kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents.  Table 24 shows 
the descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  A difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers 
per 100,000 residents was identified but in the opposite direction once population was 
taken into account.  The mean difference was 0.0169 more centers for states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 24.  Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean .1304 .1404 .1235 
Median .1030 .0993 .1259 
Standard Deviation .1096 .1631 .0463 
Minimum .0431 .0431 .0452 
Maximum .8520 .8520 .3131 
Skewness 5.585 4.067 1.324 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis 34.428 15.647 3.428 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 24 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Histogram Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
 Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 25.  Figure 14  illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a 
statistically significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplant centers in the 
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 26 provides results 
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal 
variance in both groups (p = .257) and the t (206) = -.665, p = .507.  This analysis found 
that states with a CON regulation for solid organ transplant services did not have fewer 
kidney transplant centers per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ transplant 
CON regulation. 
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Table 25. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log -.9435 -.9542 -.9362 
Median of Log -.9872 -1.003 -.8999 
Standard Deviation of Log .1917 .2352 .1562 
Minimum of Log -1.3655 -1.3655 -1.3449 
Maximum of Log -.0696 -.0696 -.5043 
Skewness of Log 1.764 2.483 .031 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log 6.655 7.584 .037 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 
Residents 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Table 26.  T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 
Residents 
 Kidney Transplant Centers 
per 100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
1.290 
.257 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.665 
206 
.507 
-.0180 
.0271 
 
 
-.0715 
.0354 
-.617 
132.080 
.538 
-.0180 
.0292 
 
 
-.0759 
.0398 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 27 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 206) = .443, p = .507] in the mean number of kidney transplant centers 
per 100,000 residents in the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation. 
 
Table 27.  ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Centers per 100,000 
Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .016 1 .016 .443 .507 
Within Groups 7.594 206 .037   
Total 7.611 207    
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The number of transplant centers per state were statistically lower (p = 0.17) in 
states with a solid organ transplant CON, as expected.   Of the 308 transplant centers 
studied, 126 centers were in states with solid organ transplant CON regulations while 183 
were in states without solid organ transplant CON regulations (see Table 2).  In summary, 
for heart and kidney transplant centers together, the number of transplant centers per state 
was impacted by the presence of a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  The hypothesis 
is supported in that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation in place have fewer 
transplant centers than states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
When the type of transplant center (heart or kidney) was examined separately, only 
the number of kidney transplant centers per state remained statistically significant for states 
with a solid organ transplant CON in place.  The number of heart transplant centers per 
state with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations were not found to be 
statistically different. 
In an attempt to account for the differences in population between states, a different 
variable was created and tested (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents); no 
significance is found between states with and without CON regulations for solid organ 
transplants using this measure. 
 
Hypothesis #2:  Transplant Volume Analysis  
 CON regulations were also intended to ensure improved quality and clinical 
proficiency by limiting the number of healthcare facilities performing complex medical 
procedures and thus increasing the volume of procedures performed at approved facilities.  
92 
 
The second hypothesis of this study is that transplant center in states with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation will perform more heart and kidney transplant procedures than 
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  The null 
hypothesis is that there is no difference in the number of heart and kidney transplant 
procedures performed by transplant centers in states with or without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.   
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state was used and the total number of transplant 
procedures performed by every center in the state was tested.  Table 28 shows the results 
and as expected transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation 
performed on the average more transplants (185 versus 170).  A difference in the mean 
number of transplant procedures was identified.  Transplant centers in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation performed 15.4 more transplant procedures than 
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 28. Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers in 
States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 175.94 185.06 169.66 
Median 116.00 130.00 107.00 
Standard Deviation 179.080 185.614 174.676 
Minimum 4 4 4 
Maximum 1,008 867 1,008 
Skewness 1.917 1.728 2.080 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 4.051 2.686 5.380 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 28 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 15.  
Figure 15.  Histogram Transplant Volume per Center 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 29.  Figure 16  illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the mean number of procedures performed by transplant centers in states with 
and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 30 provides results from the 
independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in 
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both groups (p = .708) and the t (307) = .565, p = .572.  This analysis found that transplant 
centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform 
a significantly different number of transplant procedures.  This does not support the 
hypostasis and the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 29.  Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Center 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Center 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean of Log 2.0293 2.0474 2.0169 
Median of Log 2.0645 2.1139 2.0294 
Standard Deviation of Log .46578 .47699 .45880 
Minimum of Log .60 .60 .60 
Maximum of Log 3.00 2.93 3.00 
Skewness of Log -.356 -.413 -.324 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis of Log -.102 -.161 -.015 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .276 .428 .357 
 
Figure 16.  Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
95 
 
 
Table 30.  T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
Transplant Volume per 
Center 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.141 
.708 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
.565 
307 
.572 
.03050 
.05398 
 
 
-.07571 
.13672 
.561 
261.967 
.575 
.03050 
.05437 
 
 
-.07655 
.13756 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 31 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 307) = .319, p = .572] in the mean number of transplant procedures 
performed by transplant centers in states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 31.  ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Volume per Center 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .069 1 .069 .319 .572 
Within Groups 66.751 307 .217   
Total 66.820 308    
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The above analysis does not support the hypothesis that CON regulations increase 
volume per center by restricting the number of facilities that perform procedures.  As with 
the first hypothesis, one concern is the differences in state populations.  As a rough proxy 
for this idea, a test for differences between the state volumes was performed by creating a 
new variable (Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents).  This variable was created using 
the number of transplant procedures performed in the state normalized to the state average 
population for 2006 through 2008.  Table 32 shows the descriptive statistics for this new 
variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  A difference 
in the mean volume of transplants performed per state was identified.  The mean difference 
was 2.0764 more transplants were performed per 100,000 residents in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation than in states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 32. Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 20.0228 21.2525 19.1761 
Median 18.2773 18.5641 17.3902 
Standard Deviation 10.6749 15.0714 5.9219 
Minimum 3.8163 7.9510 3.8163 
Maximum 93.2142 93.2142 31.9843 
Skewness 5.235 4.381 .400 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 33.733 18.766 -.105 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 32 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 17. 
Figure 17.  Histogram Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 33.  Figure 18 illustrates that the transformed variable 
is normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data 
for transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of transplants performed per 100,000 residents 
in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 34 provides 
results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is 
equal variance in both groups (p = .347) and the t (307) = 1.187, p = .236.  This analysis 
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found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform more 
transplant procedures per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ transplant 
CON regulation.  So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis 
continues to be not supported.   
Table 33. Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Center 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Center 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean of Log 1.2691 1.2817 1.2605 
Median of Log 1.2619 1.2687 1.2403 
Standard Deviation of Log .15410 .16612 .14508 
Minimum of Log .58 .90 .58 
Maximum of Log 1.97 1.97 1.50 
Skewness of Log .897 2.558 -.853 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis of Log 6.896 9.825 2.421 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .276 .428 .357 
 
Figure 18.  Histogram Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
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Table 34.  T-Test Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 Transplant Volume per 
100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
Levene‘s test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.887 
.347 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
1.187 
307 
.236 
.02115 
.01783 
 
 
-.01393 
.05623 
1.157 
244.460 
.248 
.02115 
.01828 
 
 
-.01485 
.05715 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 35 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference  [F (1, 307) = 1.408, p = .236] in the mean number of transplant procedures per 
100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation. 
 
Table 35.  ANOVA Log Transformation Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .033 1 .033 1.408 .236 
Within Groups 7.281 307 .024   
Total 7.314 308    
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Type of Transplant 
The next step, as with the first hypothesis, was to see if a significant difference 
existed between the two types of organ transplants under study – heart and kidney 
transplants.    Table 36 shows the descriptive statistics for heart transplant volume for 
transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  
Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation performed on the 
average fewer heart transplant procedures (56.79 versus 58.63).  A difference in the mean 
number of transplant procedures was identified.  Transplant centers in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation performed 1.84 fewer heart transplant procedures than 
transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
 
Table 36. Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Heart Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean 57.86 56.79 58.63 
Median 44.00 42.50 44.00 
Standard Deviation 49.139 49.314 49.424 
Minimum 4 8 4 
Maximum 281 281 268 
Skewness 2.314 2.652 2.141 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis 6.855 9.773 5.637 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .717 .613 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
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and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 36 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 19.  
Figure 19.  Histogram Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 37.  Figure 20 illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for heart transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of heart transplant procedures performed by 
transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  
Table 38 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups (p = .964) and the t (99) = -.022,  p = 
.983.  This analysis found that transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation did not perform a significantly different number of heart 
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transplant procedures.  This does not support the hypothesis and the null hypothesis is 
accepted. 
Table 37.  Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log 1.6323 1.6314 1.6329 
Median of Log 1.6435 1.6269 1.6435 
Standard Deviation of Log .3512 .3314 .3675 
Minimum of Log .60 .90 .60 
Maximum of Log 2.45 2.45 2.43 
Skewness of Log -.378 -.004 -.576 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log .553 -.003 .872 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
Figure 20.  Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
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Table 38.  T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
Heart Transplant Volume 
per Center 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.002 
.964 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.022 
99 
.983 
-.0015 
.0712 
 
 
-.1429 
.13987 
-.022 
93.535 
.982 
-.0015 
.0700 
 
 
-.1406 
.1375 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 39 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 99) = .000, p = .983.] in the mean number of transplant procedures 
performed by heart transplant centers in states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 39.  ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 1 .000 .000 .983 
Within Groups 12.338 99 .125   
Total 12.338 100    
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The above analysis is not consistent with the hypothesis that CON regulations 
increases volume per center by restricting the number of facilities that perform those 
procedures.  As with the first hypothesis, one concern is the differences in population per 
state.  As a rough proxy for this idea, a test for differences between the state volumes was 
performed by creating a new variable (Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents).  
This variable was created using the number of heart transplant procedures performed by 
transplant centers in the state normalized to the state average population for 2006 through 
2008.  Table 40 shows the descriptive statistics for this new variable for states with and 
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  A difference in the mean volume of 
heart transplants performed per state was identified.  The mean difference was 0.4333 
more heart transplants were performed per 100,000 residents for states with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 40. Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Heart Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean 19.9316 20.1847 19.7514 
Median 18.5288 18.5995 17.7288 
Standard Deviation 8.9143 12.0013 5.9258 
Minimum 7.6378 10.7180 7.6378 
Maximum 93.2142 93.2142 31.9843 
Skewness 5.697 5.723 .508 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis 45.740 35.522 -.383 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .717 .613 
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 36 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 21. 
Figure 21.  Histogram Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 41.  Figure 22 illustrates that the transformed variable 
is normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data 
for heart transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of heart transplants performed per 100,000 
residents in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 42  
provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  
There is equal variance in both groups (p = .163) and the t (99) = -.071, p = .944.  This 
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analysis found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform 
more heart transplant procedures than those without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation.  So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the hypothesis 
continues to not be supported.   
Table 41. Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Heart 
Transplant Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log 1.2753 1.2742 1.2761 
Median of Log 1.2678 1.2695 1.2487 
Standard Deviation of Log .1346 .1385 .1329 
Minimum of Log .88 1.03 88 
Maximum of Log 1.97 1.97 1.50 
Skewness of Log 1.094 2.866 -.270 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log 6.546 15.467 .254 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
Figure 22.  Histogram Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 
Residents 
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Table 42.  T-Test Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 
Residents 
 Heart Transplant Volume 
per 100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
1.974 
.163 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.071 
99 
.944 
-.0019 
.0273 
 
 
-.0561 
.0522 
-.070 
86.223 
.944 
-.0019 
.0275 
 
 
-.0566 
.0527 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 43 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 99) = .005, p = .944] in the mean number of heart transplant procedures 
per 100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 43.  ANOVA Log Transformation Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 1 .000 .005 .944 
Within Groups 1.812 99 .018   
Total 1.812 100    
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To continue testing the second hypothesis, the explanatory variable of the presence 
of a solid organ transplant CON regulation for the state in which the centers are located 
was used and the number of kidney transplant procedures performed by transplant centers 
was tested.  Table 44 shows the results and, as expected, transplant centers in states with a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation performed on the average more kidney transplant 
procedures (249 versus 222).  A difference in the mean number of kidney transplant 
procedures was identified.  Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation performed 26.72 more kidney transplant procedures than transplant centers in 
states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 44. Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean 233.27 249.20 222.48 
Median 170.00 170.50 169.00 
Standard Deviation 190.905 195.436 187.800 
Minimum 4 4 12 
Maximum 1,008 857 1,008 
Skewness 1.582 1.392 1.751 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis 2.566 1.339 3.762 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 44  indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 23.  
109 
 
Figure 23.  Histogram Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 45.  Figure 24  illustrates that the transformed variable 
was normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed 
data for kidney transplant volume per center to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of procedures performed in centers located in 
states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 46 provides results 
from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal 
variance in both groups (p = .551) and the t (206) = 1.024 , p = .307.  This analysis found 
that kidney transplant centers in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation did not perform a significantly different number of kidney transplant 
procedures.  This does not support the hypothesis and the null hypothesis is accepted. 
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Table 45.  Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log 1.2661 1.2854 1.2531 
Median of Log 1.2619 1.2678 1.2403 
Standard Deviation of Log .1629 .1790 .1504 
Minimum of Log .58 .90 .58 
Maximum of Log 1.97 1.97 1.50 
Skewness of Log .855 2.437 -1.018 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log 6.793 8.469 2.896 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
 
Figure 24.  Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
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Table 46.  T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 
 
Kidney Transplant Volume 
per Center 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.356 
.551 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
1.024 
206 
.307 
.0558 
.0545 
 
 
-.0516 
.1633 
1.015 
172.828 
.312 
.0558 
.0550 
 
 
-.0527 
.1644 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 47 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 206) = 1.048, p = .307] in the mean number of kidney transplant 
procedures performed by kidney transplant centers in states with and without a solid 
transplant CON regulation. 
 
Table 47.  ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .156 1 .156 1.048 .307 
Within Groups 30.675 206 .149   
Total 30.831 207    
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The above analysis is not consistent with hypothesis that CON regulations improve 
volume by restricting the number of facilities that perform procedures.  As with the 
previous tests, one concern is the state‘s population.  As a rough proxy for this idea, a test 
for differences between the state volumes was performed by creating a new variable 
(Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents).  This variable was created using the 
number of kidney transplant procedures performed in the state normalized to the state 
average population for 2006 through 2008.  Table 48 shows the descriptive statistics for 
this new variable for states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  A 
difference in the mean volume of kidney transplants performed per state was identified.  
The mean difference was 2.884 more kidney transplants were performed per 100,000 
residents for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
Table 48. Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean 20.0670 21.7864 18.9024 
Median 18.2773 18.5288 17.3902 
Standard Deviation 11.4524 16.4340 5.9243 
Minimum 3.8163 7.9510 3.8163 
Maximum 93.2142 93.2142 31.9843 
Skewness 5.038 4.009 .360 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis 30.208 15.403 .036 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
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In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 48  indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 25.  
Figure 25.  Histogram Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
 
Using a log transformation, a new variable was created with the resulting 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 49.  Figure 26  illustrates that the transformed variable 
is normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data 
for kidney transplant volume per 100,000 residents to determine if there was a statistically 
significant difference in the mean number of kidney transplants performed per 100,000 
residents in states with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 50 
provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  
There is equal variance in both groups (p = .778) and the t (206) = 1.407, p = .161.  This 
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analysis found that states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not perform 
more kidney transplant procedures per 100,000 residents than those without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  So when normalized by the rough measure of population, the 
hypothesis continues to  not be supported.   
 
Table 49. Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log 1.2661 1.2854 1.2531 
Median of Log 1.2619 1.2678 1.2403 
Standard Deviation of Log .1629 .1790 .1504 
Minimum of Log .58 .90 .58 
Maximum of Log 1.97 1.97 1.50 
Skewness of Log .855 2.437 -1.018 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log 6.793 8.469 2.896 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
 
Figure 26.  Histogram Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 
Residents 
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Table 50.  T-Test Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 
Residents 
 Kidney Transplant Volume 
per 100,000 Residents 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.080 
.778 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
1.407 
206 
.161 
.0323 
.0229 
 
 
-.0129 
.0776 
1.361 
157.155 
.175 
.0323 
.0237 
 
 
-.0146 
.0792 
  
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 51 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 206 ) = 1.980, p = .161] in the mean number of kidney transplant 
procedures per 100,000 residents performed in the states with and without a solid 
transplant CON regulation. 
Table 51.  ANOVA Log Transformation Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 
Residents 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .052 1 .052 1.980 .161 
Within Groups 5.444 206 .026   
Total 5.496 207    
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No statistical differences were found in the transplant center volume between states 
with and without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Even though the number of 
centers was fewer for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation, the  volume per 
center did not prove to be higher for centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON 
regulations.  This requires that the null hypothesis be accepted.  Even though CON 
regulations were established to increase volume by limiting providers that does not prove 
correct for heart and kidney transplant center volume.  Differences in volume may be 
affected by other factors such as supply of organs for transplantation.  The demand for 
solid organ transplantation, as measured by the number of registrants on the waiting list on 
December 31
st
 of each year, increased by 250 percent from 1995 to 2005.  However, the 
number of transplants performed grew only by 52 percent over the same period (UNOS, 
2010).  This disparity between utilization and potential demand could be due to the limited 
organ supply rather than the capacity of transplant centers.  
As with the first hypothesis, another variable was created in an attempt to account 
for the differences in population between states.  There was no difference in transplants per 
100,000 residents between states with and without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulations. 
Heart and kidney transplant center volumes were examined separately.  There was 
no difference found in transplant center volume in states with and without solid organ 
transplant CON regulations.   
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Analysis - Hypothesis #3 
 The third hypothesis tests whether the presence of a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation is associated with lower graft failures and mortality.  It is has been stated 
previously that the intent of CON was to restrict the number of healthcare providers, 
leading to higher procedural volume per center.  Higher procedural volume has been 
associated with lower mortality rates in previous studies cited in this literature review 
(Hannan et al, 1989; Begg et al., 1998).  The third hypothesis states that there fewer graft 
failures and patient deaths in transplant centers that reside in states with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  The null hypothesis is that there is not a relationship between a 
solid organ transplant CON regulation and graft failures or patient deaths for that 
transplant center.  For organ transplantation, two outcomes are used – the failure of the 
transplanted organ and/or the patient‘s death.   
To test this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios for the observed to 
expected (O/E) graft failures and patient deaths were tested.  Table 52 shows descriptive 
statistics for observed to expected ratio for graft failures.  As expected, states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected  ratio for graft failures 
(1.0471 versus 1.1972).  A difference in the mean observed to expected  ratio for graft 
failures was identified.  Centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had 
a 0.15 lower observed to expected ratio than states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation. 
 
118 
 
Table 52.  Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 1.1360 1.0471 1.1972 
Median 1.0200 .9250 1.0400 
Standard Deviation .82565 .76948 .85892 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 8.64 7.11 8.64 
Skewness 4.035 4.095 4.038 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 30.030 30.137 30.501 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 52 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 27. 
Figure 27.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 53.  Figure 28 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected  ratio of transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ transplant 
CON regulation.  Table 54 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test 
for Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups (p = .715) and the 
 t (307) = -1.841, p = .067.  This analysis found transplant centers in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to expected  ratio for graft 
failures than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. The 
direction of effects on quality was as expected on all tests, although the magnitude of 
effects did not reach statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the .05 level, 
suggesting that the magnitude of difference may be due to chance.    
Table 53.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean of Log 1.1178 1.0910 1.1362 
Median of Log 1.1053 1.0733 1.1119 
Standard Deviation of Log .21287 .20516 .21665 
Minimum of Log .69 .69 .69 
Maximum of Log 2.36 2.21 2.36 
Skewness of Log 1.268 1.260 1.286 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis of Log 5.377 6.138 5.195 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .276 .428 .357 
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Figure 28.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures. 
 
Table 54.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
 Ratio Observed to Expected 
Graft Failures 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.133 
.715 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.841 
307 
.067 
-.04520 
.02455 
 
 
-.09350 
.00310 
-1.860 
278.058 
.064 
-.04520 
.02430 
 
 
-.09304 
.00264 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 55 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
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difference [F (1, 307) = 3.390, p = .067] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft 
failures for transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 55.  ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .152 1 .152 3.390 .067 
Within Groups 13.804 307 .045   
Total 13.956 308    
 
 
Type of Transplant 
To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratio for 
the observed to expected (O/E) graft failures by transplanted organ were tested.  Table 56 
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for graft failures for heart 
transplants.  As expected, states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower 
observed to expected ratio for graft failures (.9752 versus 1.2824).  A difference in the 
mean observed to expected ratio for graft failures was identified.  States with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation had a 0.3072 lower observed to expected ratio than states 
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.   
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Table 56.  Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant Centers 
 
All Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Center in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean 1.1547 .9752 1.2824 
Median .9900 .8600 1.0500 
Standard Deviation 1.0097 .6374 1.1960 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 8.64 2.68 8.64 
Skewness 4.288 .6375 4.208 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .644 .311 
Kurtosis 29.649 .365 24.608 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .120 .613 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 56  indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 29.  
Figure 29.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant Centers 
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 57.  Figure 30 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected ratio of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  Table 58 provides results from the independent t-test and 
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is not equal variance in both groups  
(p = .542.) and the t (99) = -1.590, p = .115.  This analysis found heart transplant centers in 
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a statistically significant 
lower observed to expected ratio for graft failures than centers in states without a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation.  The hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no 
statistically significant difference in the observed to expected ratio for graft failures. 
Table 57.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart Transplant 
Centers 
 
All Heart 
Transplant Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log 1.1145 1.0686 1.1472 
Median of Log 1.0953 1.0508 1.1151 
Standard Deviation of Log .2467 .2101 .2667 
Minimum of Log .69 .69 .69 
Maximum of Log 2.36 1.54 2.36 
Skewness of Log 1.343 .152 1.664 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log 5.529 -.372 6.435 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
 
124 
 
Figure 30.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart 
Transplant Centers 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 58.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Heart 
Transplant Centers 
 Ratio Observed to Expected 
Graft Failures 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.374 
.542 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.590 
99 
.115 
-.0786 
.0494 
 
 
-.1767 
.0195 
-1.655 
97.930 
.101 
-.0786 
.0475 
 
 
-.1729 
.0156 
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As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any significant differences between the means.  Table 59 
shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant difference  
[F (1, 99) = 2.528, p = .115] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft failures for 
heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON regulation.   
Table 59.  ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .152 1 .152 2.528 .115 
Within Groups 5.935 99 .060   
Total 6.087 100    
 
To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios 
for the observed to expect graft failures and patient deaths were tested for kidney 
transplants.  Table 60 shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected  ratio for graft 
failures.  As expected, states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower 
observed to expected ratio for graft failures (1.0831 versus 1.1567).  A difference in the 
mean observed to expected ratio for graft failures was identified.  States with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation had on the average a .0736 lower observed ratio than states 
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
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Table 60.  Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney Transplant Centers 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean 1.1270 1.0831 1.1567 
Median 1.0200 1.0050 1.0350 
Standard Deviation .7222 .8289 .6418 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 7.11 7.11 3.69 
Skewness 3.362 4.777 1.319 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis 22.786 33.561 2.410 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 60  indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 31.  
Figure 31.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney Transplant Centers 
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Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 61.  Figure 32 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected ratio of kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  Table 62 provides results from the independent t-test and 
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups  
(p = .949) and the t (206) = -1.044, p = .298.  This analysis found kidney transplant centers 
in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to 
expected ratio for graft failures than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation.  The hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no statistically significant 
difference in the observed to expected ratio for graft failures. 
Table 61.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Ratio Graft Failures for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log 1.1194 1.1023 1.1310 
Median of Log 1.1053 1.1003 1.1102 
Standard Deviation of Log .1949 .2030 .1892 
Minimum of Log .69 .69 .69 
Maximum of Log 2.21 2.21 1.74 
Skewness of Log 1.176 1.903 .632 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log 4.598 9.746 .843 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
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Figure 32.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failure for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 
 
 
Table 62.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 Ratio Observed to Expected 
Graft Failure 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
.004 
.949 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.044 
206 
.298 
-.0287 
.0275 
 
 
-.0830 
.0255 
-1.030 
169.797 
.304 
-.0287 
.0279 
 
 
-.0838 
.0263 
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As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 63 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 206) = 1.091, p = .298] in the mean ratio of observed to expected graft 
failures for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 63.  ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Graft Failures for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .041 1 .041 1.091 .298 
Within Groups 7.827 206 .038   
Total 7.868 207    
 
 
The second part of the test for quality is patient deaths (mortality).  If CON meets 
its intention, centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation would have 
fewer observed to expected patient deaths.  To test this portion of the hypothesis, the 
explanatory variable of transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides 
was used and the observed to expected ratio for patient deaths was tested.  Table 64 shows 
descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for patient deaths.  As expected, states 
with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio for 
patient deaths (1.0326 versus 1.1831).  A difference in the mean observed to expected ratio 
for graft failures was identified.  States with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a 
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0.15 lower observed to expected ratio than states without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation. 
Table 64.  Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplant Centers 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Centers 
in States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 1.1217 1.0326 1.1831 
Median .9300 .9050 .9600 
Standard Deviation .95335 .68707 1.09753 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 8.35 3.91 8.35 
Skewness 3.241 1.031 3.335 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 18.409 2.309 16.590 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 64 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths  
 
 
Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 65.  Figure 34 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected ratio of patient deaths in the states with and without a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation.  Table 66 provides results from the independent t-test and Levine‘s Test for 
Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups (p =.160) and the t (307) = -
1.068, p = .287.  This analysis found transplant centers in states with a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to expected ratio for patient 
deaths than centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Hypothesis 
#3 continues to not be supported since there is no statistically significant difference in the 
observed to expected ratio for patient deaths. 
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Table 65.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths 
 
All Transplant 
Centers 
Transplants Center 
in States with 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Transplant Center in 
States without 
Transplant CON 
Regulation 
Number 309 126 183 
Mean 1.1038 1.0855 1.1164 
Median 1.0750 1.0664 1.0852 
Standard Deviation .25056 .21803 .27056 
Minimum .69 .69 .69 
Maximum 2.34 1.78 2.34 
Skewness 1.035 .209 1.273 
Std. Error of Skewness .139 .216 .180 
Kurtosis 3.262 .286 3.681 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .276 .428 .357 
 
Figure 34.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths  
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Table 66.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths 
 Ratio of Observed to 
Expected Patient Deaths 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
1.982 
.160 
 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.068 
307 
.287 
-.03096 
.02900 
 
 
-.08802 
.02611 
-1.110 
299.416 
.268 
-.03096 
.02788 
 
 
-.08582 
.02391 
 
  
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 67 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 307) = 1.140, p = .287] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient 
deaths for transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation.   
 
Table 67.  ANOVA Log Transformation of Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .072 1 .072 1.140 .287 
Within Groups 19.265 307 .063   
Total 19.337 308    
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To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers reside was used and the ratio for 
the observed to expected (O/E) patient deaths by transplanted organ were tested.  Table 68 
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected ratio for patient deaths for heart 
transplants.  As expected, heart transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant 
CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths (.9695 versus 
1.278).  A difference in the mean observed to expected ratio for patient deaths was 
identified.  Transplant centers in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a 
.3086 lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths than states without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.   
Table 68.  Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant Centers 
 
All Heart 
Transplant 
Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Center in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean 1.1498 .9695 1.2781 
Median .9000 .8650 1.0900 
Standard Deviation 1.0145 .6649 1.1924 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 8.35 2.97 8.35 
Skewness 3.868 .798 3.842 
Std. Error of Skewness .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis 24.781 .873 21.053 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .476 .717 .613 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
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and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 68  indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant Centers 
 
 
Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 69.  Figure 36 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected ratio of heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  Table 70 provides results from the independent t-test and 
Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is not equal variance in both groups  
(p = .239) and the t (99) = -1.517, p = .133.  This analysis found heart transplant centers in 
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a statistically significant 
lower observed to expected ratio for patient deaths than centers in states without a solid 
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organ transplant CON regulation.  Hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no 
difference in the observed to expected ratio for patient deaths. 
 
Table 69.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart Transplant 
Centers 
 
All Heart 
Transplant Centers 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Heart Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 101 42 59 
Mean of Log 1.1115 1.0650 1.1445 
Median of Log 1.0647 1.0526 1.1282 
Standard Deviation of Log .2533 .2179 .2727 
Minimum of Log .69 .69 .69 
Maximum of Log 2.34 1.60 2.34 
Skewness of Log 1.239 .175 1.538 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .240 .365 .311 
Kurtosis of Log 4.543 -.055 5.252 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .476 .717 .613 
 
 
Figure 36.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart 
Transplant Centers 
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Table 70.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Heart 
Transplant Centers 
 Ratio Observed to Expected 
Patient Deaths 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
1.403 
.239 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-1.517 
99 
.133 
-.3086 
.2035 
 
 
-.7124 
.0952 
-1.659 
94.288 
.101 
-.3086 
.1861 
 
 
-.6780 
.0608 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 71 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 99) = 2.457, p = .120] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient 
deaths for heart transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 71.  ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .155 1 .155 2.457 .120 
Within Groups 6.262 99 .063   
Total 6.417 100    
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To continue testing this hypothesis, the explanatory variable of a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation for the state where the centers resides was used and the ratios 
for the observed to expected patient deaths was tested for kidney transplants.  Table 72 
shows descriptive statistics for observed to expected  ratio for patient deaths.  As expected, 
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation had a lower observed to expected ratio 
for patient deaths (1.0642 versus 1.1379).  A difference in the mean observed to expected 
ratio for patient deaths was identified.  Kidney transplant centers in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation had on the average a .0737 lower observed ratio than 
kidney transplant centers in states without a solid organ transplant CON regulation. 
Table 72.  Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney Transplant Centers 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant 
Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean 1.1081 1.0642 1.1379 
Median .9450 1.0550 .8950 
Standard Deviation .9244 .6996 1.0515 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 7.32 3.91 7.32 
Skewness 2.852 1.137 3.010 
Std. Error of Skewness .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis 14.312 2.949 13.619 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .336 .520 .431 
 
 
In order to test for a difference between the means, a review was completed to 
assure the assumptions for normal distribution of the measure were held.  The skewness 
and kurtosis statistics shown in Table 72 indicate that the measure was not normally 
distributed.  This is illustrated in Figure 37.  
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Figure 37.  Histogram Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney Transplant Centers 
 
 
 
Using a natural log +2, a new variable was created with the resulting descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 73.  Figure 38 illustrates that the transformed variable was 
normally distributed.  An independent t-test was then performed on the transformed data to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference in the mean observed to 
expected ratio of patient deaths for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without 
a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  Table 74 provides results from the independent t-
test and Levine‘s Test for Equality of Variances.  There is equal variance in both groups  
(p = .123) and the t (206) =-.564, p = .574.  This analysis found kidney transplant centers 
in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation did not have a lower observed to 
expected ratio for patient deaths than centers in states without a solid organ transplant 
CON regulation.  Hypothesis #3 is not supported since there is no difference in the 
observed to expected ratio for patient deaths. 
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Table 73.  Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Ratio Patient Deaths for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 
All Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
with Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Kidney Transplant 
Centers in States 
without Transplant 
CON Regulation 
Number 208 84 124 
Mean of Log 1.1001 1.0957 1.1030 
Median of Log 1.0801 1.1168 1.0630 
Standard Deviation of Log .2497 .2186 .2696 
Minimum of Log .69 .69 .69 
Maximum of Log 2.23 1.78 2.23 
Skewness of Log .941 .229 1.174 
Std. Error of Skewness of Log .169 .263 .217 
Kurtosis of Log 2.722 .521 3.129 
Std. Error of Kurtosis of Log .336 .520 .431 
 
 
Figure 38.  Histogram Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
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Table 74.  T-Test Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 Ratio Observed to Expected 
Patient Deaths 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
Levene‘s Test for Equality of 
Variances 
F 
Sig. 
2.393 
.123 
 
t-test for Equality of Means t 
df 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean Difference 
Std. Error Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Lower 
Higher 
-.564 
206 
.574 
-.0737 
.1308 
 
 
-.3317 
.1842 
-.607 
205.950 
.544 
-.0737 
.1214 
 
 
-.3131 
.1657 
 
As a further check, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also used to 
determine whether there are any statistically significant differences between the means.  
Table 75 shows the results of that test.  This analysis demonstrates no significant 
difference [F (1, 206) = .043, p = .836] in the mean ratio of observed to expected patient 
deaths for kidney transplant centers in the states with and without a solid transplant CON 
regulation.   
Table 75.  ANOVA Log Transformation Ratio of O/E Patient Deaths for Kidney 
Transplant Centers 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .003 1 .003 .043 .836 
Within Groups 12.908 206 .063   
Total 12.911 207    
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Graft and patient survival after transplant are used as measures of quality for this 
study.  Both graft failures and patient deaths showed somewhat better outcomes per center 
in states with solid organ transplant CON regulations compared to those without solid 
organ transplant regulations but these outcomes were not found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level.  When heart and kidney outcomes were examined separately, 
the relationship between solid organ transplant CON states and quality of outcomes was 
stronger for heart transplants (p = .115 than it was for kidney transplants (p = .133). The 
direction of effects on quality was as expected on all tests, although the magnitude of 
effects did not reach statistical significance using a two-tailed test at the .05 level, 
suggesting that the magnitude of difference may be due to chance.  .   
  
 
Summary of Analysis 
One of the oldest forms of governmental health regulations is represented by state 
certificate of need programs.  One of the original purposes of CON regulations were to 
concentrate expensive healthcare services within a limited number of institutions by 
requiring prior approval before these services can be offered (DiSesa et al, 2008).  These 
programs have been applied to services such as solid organ transplantation.  Such CON 
laws affecting transplantation are in effect in 21 states.  The purpose of this study was to 
assess the association of state CON regulations using clinical data available from the 
SRTR. 
 
143 
 
The first hypothesis supports one of the original  intents of CON to restrict 
providers.  The presence of a solid organ transplant CON regulation restricted the number 
of transplant centers in that state.  This study shows, as expected, that in states with a solid 
organ transplant CON regulation in place there are fewer transplant centers than states 
without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  The difference was statistically 
significant at the .05 level.  When studied separately, this pattern held for kidney transplant 
centers but not for heart transplant centers. There were fewer kidney transplant centers in 
states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation than for states without a solid organ 
transplant CON regulation.  For heart transplant centers, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the number of centers in states with and without solid organ 
transplant CON regulations.  A possible explanation for the lack of statistical significance 
for heart transplant centers is that the time to transplant of a harvested heart is significantly 
less (4 to 6 hours for hearts compared to 24 hours for kidneys.  This difference may 
account for more heart transplant centers. (A summary of the statistical differences for 
each test conducted is shown in Appendix 3). 
When a new variable was created and tested in order to account for differences in 
population size per state (Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents), no significance is 
found between states with and without CON regulations for solid organ transplants.  This 
pattern held for both heart and kidney centers when studies separately.  There was no 
difference in the number of transplant centers per 100,000 residents between states with 
and without solid organ transplant CON regulations.  This new variable was only a rough 
attempt to explain differences in need for solid organ transplants per state.  It did not take 
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into account other factors that may impact the number of centers per state such as risk 
factors of the population (obesity, cigarette smoking, diabetes) and market characteristics 
(e.g., percent uninsured, per capita personal income, proximity to bordering state centers).. 
The second hypothesis tests whether the presence of a solid organ transplant CON 
regulation is associated with higher procedural volumes for transplant centers. As 
previously stated, one of the original intents of CON laws were to reduce duplication of 
services which would lead to fewer facilities performing more procedures. This intent was 
not supported in the current study.  The study found that the volume of transplants per 
center was not significantly higher in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  
This remained the case when the specific organs were studied separately.  Neither heart nor 
kidney transplants volumes per center were statistically significantly different in states 
with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations.  This pattern held for the 
transplant volume per 100,000 residents for heart and kidney transplants combined and 
separated. Thus, the second hypothesis was rejected. 
One possible explanation for this outcome is the lack of availability of organs for 
transplantation.  In spite of improvements in graft and patient survival rates, the number of 
available organs for transplants continues to lag far behind the need.  The lack of organ 
donation has been cited as a major limiting factor in transplantation (Cameron & Forsythe, 
2009).  Thus, tests of procedural volume per center may need to account for the availability 
of organs for transplant. 
The third hypothesis looked at the quality of patient outcomes. Past studies have 
found a strong association between quality of outcomes and center volume.  Thus, CON 
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laws intended to increase volume may also affect outcome quality.  Although the 
transplant volume was not found to be statistically significant between states with and 
without solid organ transplant CON regulations, graft failures and patient deaths were both 
lower for states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation; however these differences 
did not reach statistical significance  at the 0.05 level..  When studied separately, it appears 
that the heart transplant centers performed better than the kidney transplant centers for both 
graft failures and patient deaths. However, differences between outcomes in centers 
operating with CON regulations and those without was not statistically significant at the 
.05 level for either kidney or heart transplants. Thus, the third hypothesis was not 
supported. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 The purpose of this study was to determine if the original intent of Certificate of 
Need (CON) regulations are still being met when applied to specific, complex surgical 
procedures like heart and kidney transplantation.  The study question was: 
What is the association of solid organ transplant CON regulations on the number of 
transplant centers per state, the transplant volumes and the quality outcomes of the 
transplant centers? 
CON regulations, as previously outlined, is a regulatory program, administered by states, 
that requires providers to obtain approval before establishing certain services, such as solid 
organ transplant services.  Eventually CON regulation were seen as a means to control 
healthcare costs and improve quality of care in part by limiting the number of facilities 
providing complex medical care.  One original intent of CON was ―to control costs by 
regulating major capital expenditures and changes in healthcare services capacity.‖ 
(Chayet & Sonnenreich, 1978).  As presented in the literature review for this study, most 
evidence suggests that CON regulations do not substantially reduce or contain healthcare 
costs.  For this reasons, an analysis of costs for heart and kidney transplant services was 
not part of this study.  This analysis represents the first evaluation of the potential impact 
of CON regulation on transplant centers volume and outcomes.   
The first hypothesis, states with CON regulations for solid organ transplant services 
will have fewer transplant centers than states without solid organ transplant CON 
regulations was found to be significant at the 0.5 level.  Using clinically-rich data for heart 
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and kidney transplant procedures that took place between 2006 and 2008, this study found 
that the number of transplant centers per state were lower, as expected, for states with 
CON regulations.  However, there was no significant difference in the volume of 
transplants performed per center in states with a solid organ transplant CON regulation and 
those without a solid organ transplant CON regulation.  The second hypothesis was found 
to not be significant at the 0.5 level.  The quality transplant outcomes (the third hypothesis) 
for centers in  states with and without solid organ transplant CON regulations showed a 
weak tendency to better outcomes for states with CON regulations than those without CON 
regulations, particularly for heart transplants, but this was not a statistically significant 
difference.. 
The importance of the current findings is that while solid organ transplant 
regulations may restrict the number of transplant centers in a state it has no impact of the 
volume of transplants performed at these centers or the quality outcomes.  This finding 
differs from previous findings in the published studies on volume and quality.    
Luft et al (1970) reported that the number of procedures performed at a hospital and 
mortality rates for many surgical procedures were inversely related.  Since then, this 
relation has been documented many times (Halm & Chassin, 2000).  For example, in 
studies of the Medicare population, high-volume centers were associated with significantly 
lower odds of perioperative mortality, ranging from 12% for carotid endarterectomy to 
80% for pancreatic resection (Birkmeyer et al, 2002).  Several possible explanations may 
be offered for the no volume increase for transplant centers in this study.  First, unlike the 
Medicare analysis, the current analysis used clinical data from the SRTR rather than 
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relying upon claims data or other administrative data sources.  The ability to perform 
detailed risk adjustment using clinical data has been reported to reduce the measured effect 
of volume on outcome in other studies (Halm et al, 2002).  Second, the subset of American 
hospitals where transplantation is performed is small and select.  In general, these hospitals 
must demonstrate skilled anesthesia, radiology, and intensive care capabilities in order to 
establish a transplant program (Pronovost et al, 2002).  Many of the process variables that 
contribute to volume differences across a more diverse group of hospitals performing less 
scrutinized and regulated surgical procedures may not vary to the same degree among 
transplant centers.  Third, transplant centers are subject to a legislatively mandated review 
process, administered by a government contractor, which is designed to ensure high quality 
care.  Center performance that is significantly worse than expected is flagged for audit, 
review, and remediation. 
Organ transplantation outcomes reflect the influence of many factors: patient and 
donor selection, case mix, timeliness of donor availability, operative technique, and 
postoperative medical management and immunosuppression which any one could explain 
the reason differences in outcomes and the acceptance of the null hypotheses in this study. 
The SRTR database used in this study provides clinical and outcome information 
that is not available in administrative databases and provides risk-adjusted outcomes data.  
This is a difference from analysis of data derived from administrative sources such as CMS 
MedPAR.  The SRTR database has the advantages of years of peer-reviewed development, 
refinement, and validation of its risk models, as well as national scope of representation.  
Unlike other databases, the SRTR database is not voluntary.  Any transplant center 
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performing transplants is required to submit data in order to participate in United Network 
of Organ Sharing (UNOS).   
 
Limitations of Study 
The results in this study should be interpreted in the context of the following 
limitations.  The associations, or lack of associations, between CON regulations and 
transplant services in this study can suggest, but cannot prove a causal effect of CON on 
the delivery of transplant care.  It is possible that factors not accounted for in this study 
may also be important in understanding the relationship between CON regulations and 
volume.  These factors may include managed care penetration; regional physician practice 
variation; efforts to report outcomes data to hospitals, clinicians, third-party payers, and 
the public; ownership of facility as well as organization characteristics; and differences in 
population and physician density.  The degree to which CON status is related to these 
factors has not been study or established for heart and kidney transplant programs. 
  A more specific analysis of population would add a level of analysis.  This study 
used the population of the state as a rough attempt to explain differences in need for solid 
organ transplants per state. Organ supply and organ demand vary by geographic locations 
and organ procurement organizations (UNOS, 2010).  Residents of a state are not bound to 
receive transplants only within their own state.  In many cases, due to proximity, physician 
referral or patient preference, a patient may receive their transplant outside of the state they 
reside. 
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The epidemiologic planning model was not employed in this research to analyze 
the population at risk for heart disease or end-stage renal disease. This model is a process 
to ―define, measure, and forecast the community served and its needs‖ (Griffith & White, 
2007) and could have offered additional insight into the populations served by the 
transplant centers studies.  If there is a higher concentration of disease that leads to the 
need of transplantation in a particular state or region, one would expect differences in the 
number of centers and the volume of transplants performed at those centers. The present 
study does not consider an evaluation of costs, an important component of the value 
equation (DiSesa et al, 2006).  Although charge data is available for hospitals cost 
information is not readily available.  The use of the SRTR data merged with a cost 
analysis, if it were available, would address the value question. 
The differences in the administration of CON regulation state to state also suggest 
limitation to this study.  There is likely heterogeneity in the character of CON regulations 
for transplant services across individual states, which may lead to differences in the scope 
and stringency of regulation (Vaughan-Sarrazin, 2002).  Furthermore, states without CON 
regulations may have other types of healthcare regulatory mechanisms, such as licensure 
that impacts transplant services. 
 
Future Research 
While this study added to the knowledge related to the association of CON 
programs and transplantation, it also leaves more questions to be addressed in future 
research.  For CON and transplant center outcomes, continued data analysis using the 
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SRTR database would provide interesting study.  This study used only 3 years of data but 
expanding that to more years might provide additional insight as well as expanding the 
outcomes to 3-month and 3 year instead of just the 1year used in this study. 
This study lacked information on the prevalence of diabetes, hypertension, cardiac 
disease, and end-stage renal disease, all of which may influence the need for heart and 
kidney transplantation.  Future research should take these factors into consideration in 
analyzing the volume at transplant centers. 
States with solid organ transplant CON programs may differ in their enforcement, 
and states without solid organ transplant CON programs may regulate transplant 
procedures through other means.  The study of the differences in use of CON or other 
means of regulation could offer significant insight.  
 
Implications of Study 
Despite these limitations, the current study has several important implications for 
healthcare research and policy.  Currently, efforts are under way to concentrate surgical 
procedures with significant volume-outcome effects to large-volume centers (Birkmeyer et 
al., 2003). The adoption of such a policy for heart and kidney transplantation would not be 
straightforward even if it were desirable, particularly in the case of deceased donor 
transplantation.  As with HLA matching, the benefit of high-volume center performance 
must be carefully weighed against the increased risk of graft loss associated with the 
increased cold ischemia time which would likely accompany increased regionalization of 
transplant services (Mitropoulos et al., 2005).  Furthermore, the frequent follow-up visits 
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necessary after transplantation might prove to be an added hardship if patients were forced 
to travel great distances. Because patients may be more compliant with follow-up visits if 
appointments are convenient, compliance may also be an important determinant of 
outcome. 
 As previously noted, the volume-outcome relationship appears to be particularly 
important for highly complex procedures that require a significant commitment of 
resources and highly specialized teams (Lin et al. 1998).  Organ transplantation is a clear 
example of this type of procedure.  One caution in using volumes as "indicators" of quality 
is that studies of the association between volumes and outcomes examine patterns across 
many hospitals, but the inference may not be true for individual hospitals or providers.  
There can be a number of reasons, other than poor quality, to explain why specific 
hospitals or providers may have low volumes, such as the start-up of new services, rural 
location, or a procedure performed by a high-volume surgeon in several low-volume 
hospitals.  Furthermore, hospitals may have high volumes and quality for some procedures 
but low volumes and quality for others, or volumes and quality may fluctuate over time.  
Therefore, low volumes cannot be used as an overall "indicator" of poor quality, volume 
standards will vary by procedure and disease, and it would be useful to have multiple 
measures and longitudinal data.  However, in the past one could reasonably say that in the 
absence of other quality measures, one would probably have a higher likelihood of better 
outcomes with a high volume provider than a low-volume provider (Hannan et al., 1999). 
 One of the controversial issues about volumes is whether an observed association 
between higher volumes and better outcomes is a result of more experience leading to 
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better outcomes, the "Practice-Makes-Perfect" hypothesis, or whether patients are attracted 
to hospitals with better outcomes, thereby increasing their volumes, the "Selective-
Referral" hypothesis (Luft et al., 1990).  That is, if increased volume is sufficient to 
achieve better outcomes, then increases in volumes at selected sites will improve outcomes 
(ignoring other problems such as access to care).  However, if the observed volume-
outcome relationship reflects selective referrals to better quality providers, regulatory and 
other "steering" strategies would need at least as effective indicators of quality and means 
to choose the best providers.  There is some evidence that both hypotheses may be true to 
varying degrees for different procedures (Khuri, Daley & Henderson, 1999).  
 Higher levels of nurse staffing have also been associated with improved quality of 
care in hospitals (Needleman, 2002).  Teaching status and its relationship to quality of care 
and outcomes have been examined across illnesses and procedures (Allison et al., 2000).  
Many of these studies suggest that teaching hospitals have more favorable clinical 
outcomes.  Levels of expertise and staffing may be an underlying explanation for the 
observed volume-outcome link; this could be modified to improve outcomes in low-
volume hospitals.  Although procedure volume may be a convenient proxy for quality of 
care, questions have been raised about the ramifications of policy making based on 
volume.  Although there appears to be a statistical link between volume and quality of 
care, the nature of this link is still poorly understood.  For example, recent studies have 
compared morbidity and mortality at low- and high-volume centers for esophagectomy, 
pancreatic resection, and carotid endarterectomy and suggest that volume alone is not a 
sufficient signal of quality (Padmanabhan et al., 2002).  These studies point to at least two 
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additional factors that influence outcomes: surgeons‘ skill and experience, and the presence 
of an organizational structure for assuring high quality of care, such as treatment protocols.  
It is possible that for the most complex procedures, whether frequent or infrequent, the 
hospitals providing them must maintain a certain level of staffing and technology.  In 
addition, a few specialized surgeons might perform these procedures at more than one 
hospital, so an individual hospital‘s volume, whether high or low, is a poor proxy for 
outcomes.  Individual surgeon volume, staffing, or measures of the presence of key 
technologies or practices, such as protocols, may be better measures.  Such factors should 
be further examined so  in order to understand how best to improve quality and to provide 
the basis for quality improvement initiatives.  The link between volume and outcome for 
high-technology, complex procedures is likely to be indirect and complex, reflecting at 
least the organization of healthcare services and the skill and experience of staff.   
  
Policy Implications 
When CON regulations were introduced, healthcare providers were reimbursed 
based on the cost of the services they provided, no matter how high that cost.  Their 
charges incorporated overhead expenses and the other costs of doing business, as well as 
the necessary profit margin. ―Under that scheme overbuilding was costly to everybody 
because the expenses of inefficiency were built into the reimbursements. The regulatory 
mechanism of CON regulations was developed to control costs by limiting the expansion 
of services in a geographic area‖ (Conover & Sloan, 1998).  Now, some thirty years later, 
the competitive forces of managed care have altered  healthcare.  Provider payments are 
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determined by capitation, fixed fees for services, and fee schedules that are the product of 
negotiation and have little or no bearing on the underlying costs.  Today‘s providers 
compete on price and quality of care-not costs-and are neither rewarded for nor bailed out 
when they overspend on facilities or technology (Porter & Teisberg, 2004).  Thus, CON 
regulations may no longer be an appropriate tool to regulate healthcare costs.  The free 
market – as with virtually every other business endeavor - should be allowed to determine 
need and encourage healthy competition based on price and quality of care (Porter & 
Teisberg, 2004).  
Although CON may be effective in limiting the expansion of some services 
(transplant centers in this study), the role of CON programs on a national level should be 
debated in the context of research evidence of the association of CON on the quality 
outcomes.  Thus, the findings in this study are important, despite the limitations, for the 
ongoing debate regarding the lack of benefits of CON programs.  This study found no 
significant difference in transplant center volume or outcomes  in states with and without 
solid organ transplant CON regulations.  This conclusion would lead one to ask: what is 
the purpose of the continued presence of CON regulations for transplant services?  In a 
time when patient safety, medical errors, and patient outcomes as well as access and cost 
are coming under greater scrutiny, CON regulations may not be an important and effective 
regulatory mechanism for ensuring higher quality care and better patient outcomes.  
 
 
 
156 
 
References 
 
Allison, J. J., Kiefe, C. I., Weissman, N. W., & Person, S. D.  (2000). Relationship 
of hospital teaching status with quality of care and mortality for AMI patients.   Journal of 
the American Medical Association, 284, 1265-1262. 
Altman, S. & Ostby, E. K.  (1991).  Paying for hospital care: The impact of federal 
policy.  In Eli Ginzbery (Ed.), Health Services Research: Key to Health Policy.  MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
American Health Planning Association.  (2010).  National Directory: State 
Certificate of Need Programs (19
th
 ed).  VA: AHPA. 
Ameringer, C. F.  (2008).  The Health Care Revolution: From Medical Monopoly 
to Market Competition. CA:  University of California Press. 
Anderson, G.  (1992).  Examining the relationship between capital investment and 
hospital operating expenditures.  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69, 712-713. 
Anderson, G., Heyssel, R., & Dickler, R.  (1993).  Competition versus regulation: 
It‘s effect on hospitals.  Health Affairs, 12, 70-80. 
 Anderson, K. B., & Kass, D. I.  (1986).  Certificate of need regulation of entry into 
home health care: A multi-product cost function.  Wash, DC:  The Federal Trade 
Commission. 
 Antel, J. J., Ohfeld, R. L., & Becker, E. R.  (1995).  State regulations and hospital 
costs.  The Review of Economics and Statistics, 77, 416-422. 
157 
 
 Arnold, J. & Mendelson, D.  (1992).  Evaluation of the Pennsylvania certificate of 
need program. Submitted to the Pennsylvania Legislative Budget and Finance Committee. 
Lewin ICF. 
 Ashby, J. L.  (1984).  The impact of hospital regulatory programs on per capita 
costs, utilization, and capital investment.  Inquiry, 2, 45-59. 
 Axelrod, D. A., Guidinger, M. K., McCullough, K. P., Leichtman, A. B., Punch, J. 
D., & Merion, R. M.  (2004).  Association of center volume with outcomes after liver and 
kidney transplantation.  American Journal of Transplantation, 4, 920-927. 
 Banta, H. D., Engel, G. L., & Schersten, T.  (1992).  Volume and outcome of organ 
transplantation.  International Journal of Technology Assessment in Healthcare, 8, 490-
505. 
Bazzoli, G. J., Gerland, A., & May, J.   (2006).  Construction activity in U.S. 
hospitals.  Health Affairs, 25, 783-791. 
 Begg,  C. B., Cramer, L. D., Hoskins, W. J., & Brennan, M. F.  (1998).  Impact of 
hospital volume on operative mortality for major cancer surgery.  Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 280, 1747–1751.  
 Birkmeyer, J. D.  (2000).  Relation of surgical volume to outcome.  Annals of 
Surgery, 232, 724-725. 
Birkmeyer, J. D., Siewers, A. E., Finlayson, E. V., Stukel, T. A., Lucas, F. L, 
Batista, I., Welch, H. G., & Wennberg, D. E.  (2002).  Hospital volume and surgical 
mortality in the United States.  New England Journal of Medicine, 346, 1128-1137. 
158 
 
Birkmeyer, J. D., Stukel, T. A., Siewers, A. E., Goodney, P. P., Wennberg, D. E., & 
Lucas, F. L.  (2003).  Surgeon volume and operative mortality in the United States.  New 
England Journal of Medicine, 349, 2117-2127. 
 Brown, E., Smith, D., & Sindelar, J.  (1992).  Can we regulate the quality of care?: 
The case of dialysis in Connecticut.  American Journal of Kidney Diseases, 19, 609-613. 
 Burling, S.  (1998).  New Jersey minimums of bypass surgery may be up in July.  
Philadelphia Inquirer, April 26. 
 Cameron, S. & Forsythe, J.  (2009).  How can we improve organ donation rates?  
Neurology, 21, 68-74. 
 Chayer & Sonnenreich, P. C.  (1978).  Certificate of Need: An Expanding 
Regulatory Concept.   Wash, DC: Medicine in the Public Interest. 
 Chen, J., Radford, M. J., Wang, Y., Marciniak, T. A., & Krumholtz, H. M. (1999).  
Do ―American‘s Best Hospitals‖ perform better for acute myocardial infarction?  New 
England Journal of Medicine, 349, 286-292. 
 Christian, C. K., Gustafson, M. L., Betensky, R. A., Daley, J., & Zinner, M. J.  
(2003).  The Leapfrog volume criteria may fall short in identifying high-quality surgical 
centers.  Annals of Surgery, 238, 447-457. 
 Cimasi, R. J.  (2002).  Certificate of need regulatory policy and  hospital utilization.  
DC: Health Capital Consultant. 
 Clinton, W. J.  (1993).  Health Security Plan, Speech to Joint Session of Congress.   
 Collins, A. J., & Keane, M. W.  (1997).  Reuse of hemodialyzers: Is there a risk in 
1994?  Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation, 12, 126-132. 
159 
 
 Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office.  (1988).  The Impact 
of PSROs on Healthcare Costs: Update of CBO‘s 1979 Evaluation.  Washington, DC:  US 
Government Printing Office. 
Conover, C. J., & Sloan, F. A.  (1998).  Does removing certificate-of 
need regulation lead to a surge in healthcare spending?  Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law, 23, 455-487. 
 Cox, D. R.  (1972).  Regression models and life tables.  Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series B, 34, 187-220. 
 Cram, P., Rosenthal, G. E., & Vaughan-Sarrazin, M. S.  (2005).  Cardiac 
revascularization in specialty and general hospitals.  New England Journal of Medicine, 
352, 1454-1462. 
 Custer, W.S.  (1997).  Certificate of need regulation and the healthcare delivery 
system.  Center for Risk Management and Insurance Research, Research Report No. 97(1), 
Georgia State University. 
 Delaware Healthcare Commission, Cost Containment Committee.  (1996).  
Evaluation of Certificate of Need and Other Health Planning Mechanisms, Volume I: Final 
Report; and Volume II, Technical Appendices.  
 Delmez, J. A., Windus, D. W., & the St. Louis Nephrology group.  (1992).  
Hemodialysis prescription and delivery in a metropolitan community.  Kidney 
International, 41, 1023-1028. 
 DiSesa, V. J., O‘Brien, S. M., Welke, K. F., Beland, S. M., Haan, C. K., Vaughan-
Sarrazin, M. S., & Peterson, E. D.  (2006).  Contemporary impact of state certificate-of-
160 
 
need regulations for cardiac surgery: An analysis using the Society of Thoracic Surgeons‘ 
National Cardiac Surgery Database.  Circulation, 114, 2122-2129. 
 Dudley, R. A., Johansen, K. L., Brand, R., Rennie, D. J., & Milstein, A.  (2000).  
Selective referral to high-volume hospitals.  Journal of the American Medical Association, 
283, 1159-1166. 
 Dunham, A. B.  (1981).  Health and Politics: The Impact of Certificate of Need 
Regulation.  Wash., DC:  National Center for Health Science Research. 
 Enthoven, A. & Kronick, R.  (1989).  A consumer-choice health plan for the 1990s, 
universal health insurance in a system designed to promote quality and economy.  New 
England Journal of Medicine, 320, 29-37. 
 Epstein, A.  (1995).  Performance reports on Quality—Prototypes, problems and 
propects.  New England Journal of Medicine, 333, 57-61. 
 Federal Trade Commission (1986).  Certificate of Need regulation of Entry Into 
Hone Healthcare Markets.  Washington, DC. 
 Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice.  (2004).  Improving 
Healthcare: A Dose of Competition.  Washington, DC. 
 Feldman, R. D.  (2000).  American healthcare: Government, Market Processes, and 
the Public Interest.  NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
 Feldstein, P. J.  (2005).  Health Care Economics (6
th
 ed.).  NY: Thomson Delmar. 
 Finkelstein, A.  (2006).  The aggregate effects of health insurance: Evidence from 
the introduction of Medicare.  National Bureau of Economic Research, 4. 
161 
 
 Glasgow, R. E., & Mulvihill, S. J.  (1996).  Hospital volume influences outcomes 
in patients undergoing pancreatic resection surgery.  The Western Journal of Medicine, 
165, 294-300. 
 Ginsburg, P. B. & Koretz, D. M.  (1983).  Bed availability and hospital utilization: 
estimates of the ―Roemer effect‖.  Healthcare Financing Review, 5, 87-92. 
 Griffith, J. R. & White, K. R.  (2007).  The Well-Managed Healthcare Organization 
(sixth Edition).  Chicago:  Health Administration Press. 
 Griffiths, R. I., Powe, D. J., Gaskin, D. J., Anderson, G. F., Lissovoy, G. V., & 
Whelton, P. K.  (1994).  The production of dialysis by for-profit versus not-for-profit 
freestanding renal dialysis facilities.  Health Services Research, 29, 473-487. 
 Gruber, J.  (1994).  The effect of competitive pressure on charity: Hospital 
responses to price shopping in California.  Journal of Health Economics, 13, 183-211. 
 Hackey, R. B.  (1993).  New wine in old bottles: Certificate of need enters the 
1990s.  Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 18, 927-935. 
 Halm, E. A., Lee, C., & Chassin, M. R.  (2002).  Is volume related to outcome in 
healthcare? A systematic review and methodologic critique of the literature.  Annals of 
Internal Medicine, 137, 511-520.  
 Hannan, E. L., Racz, M., Kavey, R., Quaegebeur, J. M., & Williams, R.  (1999).  
Pediatric cardiac surgery: The effect of hospital and surgeon volume on in-hospital 
mortality.  Pediatrics, 101, 963-969. 
 Hannan, E. L., Popp, A. J., & Tranmer, B.  (1998).  Relationship between provider 
volume and mortality for high risk surgeries.  Stroke, 29, 2292-2297. 
162 
 
 Hawkins, L.  (2004, Jan 20).  Detroit automakers fight local hospitals‘ building 
plans.  Wall Street Journal, available online at 
online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB107454982298405576. 
 Herbert, H. H.  (1977).  Health regulation: Certificate of Need and 11227.  CO: 
Aspen Systems Corp. 
 Ho, V.  (2004).  Certificate of need, volume, and percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty outcomes.  American Heart Journal, 147, 442-448. 
 Ho, V., Heslin, M. J., Yun, H., & Howard, L.  (2006).  Trends in hospital and 
surgeon volume and operative mortality for cancer surgery.  Annals of Surgical Oncology, 
13, 851-858. 
 Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1948. Pub. L. No. 79-725. 
 Hyman, H. H.  (1977).  Health Regulation: Certificate of Need.  CO: Aspen 
Systems. 
 International Society for Heart and Lung Transplantation.  (2006).  Transplant 
Registry. 
 IOM (Institute of Medicine).  (2001).  Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New health 
System for the 21
st
 Century.  Washignton, DC:  National Academy Press. 
 Irvin, R. A. (1998).  Quality of care differences by ownership form: Implications 
for cost efficiency studies.  draft prepared for the American Society for Artificial Internal 
Organs Annual Conference, April, 1998. 
 Kessler, D. P. & McClellan, M. B.  (2000).  Is hospital competition socially 
wasteful?  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 577-615. 
163 
 
 Kiel, J.  (1993).  How state policy affects rural hospital consortia: The rural 
healthcare delivery system.  The Milbank Quarterly, 71, 625-643. 
 Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (Eds.).  (1999).  To Err is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System.  Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Khuri, S. F., Daley, J., & Henderson, W.  (1998).  Enhancing the quality of surgical 
procedures.  Annals of Surgery, 228, 491-507. 
 Khuri, S. F., Daley, J., & Henderson, W.  (1999).  Relation of surgical volume to 
outcome in eight common operations.  Annals of Surgery, 230, 414-429. 
 Lanning, J. A., Morrisey, M. A., & Ohsfeldt, R. L.  (1991).  Endogenous hospital 
regulation and its effects on hospital and non-hospital expenditures.  Journal of Regulatory 
Economics, 3, 137-154. 
 Lin, H. M., Kauffman, H. M., & McBride, M. A.  (1998).  Center-specific graft and 
patient survival rates.  Journal of the American Medical Association, 280, 1153-1160. 
Luft, H. S., Bunker, J. P., & Enthoven, A. C.  (1979).  Should operations be 
regionalized?  The empirical relation between surgical volume and mortality.  New 
England Journal of Medicine, 301, 1364–1369. 
 Luft, H. S., Garnick, D. W., Mark, D. H., & McPhee, S. J.  (1990).  Hospital 
Volume, Physician Volume, and Patient Outcomes.  MI: Health Administration Press. 
 Madden, C. W.  (1999).  Excess capacity: Markets, regulation, and values.  Health 
Services Research, 33, 1651-1668. 
164 
 
 McGinley, P.  (1995).  Beyond healthcare reform: Reconsidering certificate of need 
laws in a managed competition system.  Florida State University Law Review, 231, 345-
357. 
 Mendelson, D. N. & Arnold, J.  (1993).  Certificate of need revisited.  Spectrum: 
The Journal of State Governments, 66, 36-44. 
 Missouri Health Facilities Review Committee.  (2004).  Benefits flyer available at 
www.dhss.mo.gov/CON/conbenefits. 
 Mitchell, J. M.  (2005).  Effective of physician-owned limited-service hospitals: 
Evidence from Arizona.  Health Affairs Web Exclusive, 10, 481-490. 
 Mitropoulos, F. A., Odim, J., Marelli, D., & Gjertson, D.  (2005).  Outcomes of 
transplants with long cold ischemic times.  European Journal of Cardiothoracic Surgery, 
28, 143-148. 
 Montesino, B.  (1996).  Anatomy of a roadblock: CON as an impediment to 
integrated systems.  Health Systems Review, 29, 30-32. 
 Morrisey, M.  (2001).  Competition in hospital and health insurance markets: A 
review and research agenda.  Health Services Research, 36, 191-221. 
 National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974 (1975). Pub. L. 
No. 93-641. 88 Stat. 2225. 
 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984.  Pub. L. No. 98-507. 98  Stat. 2342. 
 Needleman, J.  (2002).  Nurse staffing levels and the quality of care in hospitals.  
New England Journal of Medicine, 346, 1715-1722. 
165 
 
 Noether, M.  (1987).  Competition among hospitals.  Journal of Health Economics, 
7, 259-284. 
 Organ Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN).  (2010). 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ 
 Padmanabhan, R. S., Byrnes, M. C., Helmer, S. D., Smith, R. S., & Whittaker, L.  
(2002).  Should high risk surgeries be performed in low-volume centers?  American 
Surgeon, 68, 348-351. 
 Popescu, I., Vaughan-Sarrazin, M. S., & Rosenthal, G. E. (2006).  Certificate of 
need regulations and use of coronary revascularization after acute myocardial 
infarction.  Journal of the American Medical Association, 295, 2141-2147. 
 Porter, M., Teisberg, E. O., & Brown, G. B.  (1994).  Making competition in 
healthcare work.  Harvard Business Review, 72, 131. 
 Porter, M. E. & Teisberg, E. O.  (2004).  Redefining competition in healthcare.  
Harvard Business Review, 06, 1-14. 
 Pronovost, P. J., Angus, D. C., Dorman, T.  (2002). Physician staffing patterns and 
clinical outcomes in critically ill patients: a systematic review.  Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 288, 2151-2162. 
 Rathore, S. S., Wang, Y., Radford, M. J., Ordin, D. L., & Krumholz, H. M.  (2004).  
Sex differences in cardiac catheterization after acute myocardial infarction: the role of 
procedure appropriateness.  Annals of Internal Medicine, 137, 487-493. 
 Rettig, R. A.  (1992).  Dialysis in Connecticut.  American Journal of Kidney 
Diseases 19, 614-616. 
166 
 
 Ross, J. S., Ho. V., Wang, Y., Cha, S. S., Epstein, A. J., Masoudi, F. A., 
Nallamothu, B. K., & Krumholz, H. M.  (2007).  Certificate of need regulation and cardiac 
catheterization appropriateness after acute myocardial infarction.  Circulation, 115, 1012-
1019. 
 Rubel, E. J.  (1976).  Implementing the National Health Planning and Resources 
Development Act of 1974.  Public Health Reports, 91, 3-8. 
 Roemer, M. & Shain, M.  (1992).  Hospital costs related to the supply of beds.  
Modern Hospital,  92, 71-73. 
 Salkever, D. S.  (1978).  Will regulation control healthcare costs?  Bulletin NY 
Academy of Medicine, 54, 73-83. 
 Salkever, D. S.  & Bice, T. W.  (1976).  The impact of certificate of need controls 
on hospital investment.  The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Health & Society, 54, 
185-214. 
 Salkever, D. S.  & Bice, T. W.  (1978).  Certificate of need legislation and hospital 
costs. In M. Zubkoff, I. E. Raskin, & R. S. Hanft (Eds.), Hospital Cost Containment. NY:  
Prodist. 
 Salkever, D. S.  & Bice, T. W.  (1979).  Hospital certificate of need controls: 
Impact on investment costs and use.  Technical Report, American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research. 
 Schrag, D., Panageas, K. S., Riedel, E., Hsieh, L., Bach, P. B., Guillem, J. G., & 
Begg, C.B.  (2003).  Surgeon volume compared to hospital volume as a predictor of 
167 
 
outcome following primary colon cancer resection.  Journal of Surgical Oncology, 83, 68-
78. 
 Shahian, D.  (2004).  Improving cardiac surgery quality – Volume, outcome, 
process? 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 291, 246-248. 
 Sherman, D.  (1988).  The effect of state certificate of need on hospital costs.  Staff 
report.  US Federal trade Commission, Bureau of Economics. 
 Shortell, S. M., & Hughes, E. M.  (1988).  The effects of regulation, 
competition, and ownership on mortality rates among hospital inpatients.  New England 
Journal of Medicine, 318, 1100-1107. 
 Shortell, S. M., Morrison, E. M., Hughes, S. L., Friedman, B., Coverdill, J., & 
Berg, L.  (1986).  The effects of hospital ownership on nontraditional Services.  Health 
Affairs, 5, 97-111. 
 Sloan, F.A. (1988).  Containing health expenditures: Lessons learned from 
certificate of need programs.  In F.A. Sloan, J.F. Blumstein, & J.M. Perrin (Eds.).  Cost, 
Quality, and Access in Healthcare: New Roles for Health Planning in a Competitive 
Environment. CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 Sloan, F. A., Picone, G. A., Taylor, Jr., D. H., & Chou, S.  (2001).  Hospital 
ownership and cost and quality of care: Is there a dime‘s worth of difference?  Journal of 
Health Economics, 20, 1-21. 
 Sloan, F.A. & Stienwald, B.  (1980).  Insurance, Regulation, and Hospital Costs.  
MA:  Lexington Books. 
168 
 
 Sollano, J. A. & Moskowitz, A. J.  (1999).  Volume-outcome relationship in 
cardiovascular operations.  Journal of Thoracic Cardiovascular Surgery, 117, 419-428 
 State of Washington Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee.  (1999).  
Effects of certificate of need and its possible repeal.  Washington, D.C:  US Government 
Printing Office.   
 Thiemann, D. R., Coresh, J., Powe, N. R., & Hannan, E. L.  (1999).  The relation 
between volume and outcome in healthcare.  New England Journal of Medicine, 341, 
1085-1086. 
 United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS).  (2010). www.unos.org 
 Vaughan-Sarrazin, M. S., Hannan, E. L., Gormley, M. A., & Rosenthal, G. E.  
(2002).  Mortality in Medicare beneficiaries following coronary artery bypass graft surgery 
in states with and without certificate of need regulation.  Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 288, 1859-1866. 
 Vaughan-Sarrazin, M. S. & Rosenthal, G. E.  ( 2004).  Hospital volume and 
outcome after coronary angioplasty: is there a role for certificate of need regulation?  
American Heart Journal, 147, 283-385. 
 Weaver, J. A.  (1995).  Certificate of need: What role does it have in a managed 
care environment?  In E. G. Gosfield (Ed.).  Health Law Handbook, 409-429. 
 Winter, A.  (2003).  Comparing the mix of patients in various outpatient surgery 
settings.  Health Affairs, 22, 68-75. 
 Zwanziger, J., & Melnick, G.  (1996).  Can managed care plans control healthcare 
costs?  Health Affairs, 3, 185-199. 
169 
 
Appendix 1:  CON Regulations by State 
State/District Current State CON? 
Current Organ 
Transplant CON? 
Dates of Regulations 
 Alabama Yes Yes 1979-present 
Alaska Yes Yes 1976-present 
Arizona No  1971-1985 
Arkansas  Yes No 1975-present 
California No  1969-1987 
Colorado No  1973-1987 
Connecticut  Yes Yes 1973-present  
Delaware  Yes No 1978-present 
District of Columbia Yes Yes 1977-present  
Florida Yes Yes 1973-present 
Georgia Yes No 1979-present 
Hawaii Yes Yes 1974-present 
Idaho No  1980-1983 
Illinois Yes Yes 1974-present 
Indiana No  1980-1996, 1997-1999    
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State/District Current State CON? 
Current Organ 
Transplant CON? 
Dates of Regulations 
Iowa Yes Yes 1977-present 
Kansas No   1972-1985 
Kentucky Yes Yes 1972-present 
Louisiana Yes No 1991-present 
Maine Yes Yes 1978-present 
Maryland Yes Yes 1968-present 
Massachusetts Yes Yes 1972-present 
Michigan Yes Yes 1972-present 
Minnesota No  1971-1985 
Mississippi Yes No 1979-present 
Missouri Yes No 1979-present 
Montana Yes No 1975-present 
Nebraska Yes No 1979-present 
Nevada Yes No 1971-present 
New Hampshire Yes No 1979-present 
New Jersey Yes Yes 1971-present 
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State/District Current State CON? 
Current Organ 
Transplant CON? 
Dates of Regulations 
New Mexico No  1978-1983 
New York Yes Yes 1966-present 
North Carolina Yes Yes 1978-present 
North Dakota No  1971-1995 
Ohio Yes No 1975-present 
Oklahoma Yes No 1971-present 
Oregon Yes No 1971-present 
Pennsylvania No  1979-1996 
Rhode Island Yes Yes 1968-present 
South Carolina Yes No 1971-present 
South Dakota No  1972-1988 
Tennessee Yes No 1973-present 
Texas No  1975-1985 
Utah No  1979-1984 
Vermont Yes Yes 1979-present 
Virginia Yes Yes 1973-present 
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State/District Current State CON? 
Current Organ 
Transplant CON? 
Dates of Regulations 
Washington Yes Yes 1971-present 
West Virginia Yes Yes 1977-present 
Wisconsin Yes No 1977-1987, 1993-present 
Wyoming No  1977-1989 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California 
AL  AK  AZ  AR  CA  
Air Ambulance 1         
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1 1       
Burn Care 1         
Cardiac Cath 1 1       
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners   1       
Gamma Knives 1 1       
Home Health 1     1   
Hospice 1     1   
Hospitals/Beds 1 1       
ICF/MR       1   
Lithotripsy   1       
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1 1       
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners   1       
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)   1       
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1   1   
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1 1       
Obstetrical 1 1       
Open Heart Surgery 1 1       
Solid Organ Transplant 1 1       
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)   1       
Psychiatric Beds 1 1   1   
Radiation Therapy/LinearAccelerator 1 1       
Rehabilitation 1         
Renal Dialysis 1 1       
Residential Care/Assisted Living       1   
Subacute Care   1       
Substance Abuse 1         
Swing Beds 1         
Ultra Sound           
Other 1 1   1   
Total 21 Yes 20 Yes No CON 7 Yes No CON 
174 
 
Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Colorado Connecticut Delaware 
District of 
Columbia 
Florida 
Colorado CT DE  DC FL  
Air Ambulance   1   1   
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)   1 1 1   
Burn Care   1   1   
Cardiac Cath   1 1 1   
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners   1   1   
Gamma Knives   1   1   
Home Health       1   
Hospice   1   1 1 
Hospitals/Beds   1 1 1 1 
ICF/MR         1 
Lithotripsy   1 1 1   
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)   1 1 1 1 
Medical Office Buildings       1   
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners   1   1   
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)   1   1   
Nursing Home/Beds   1 1 1 1 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)   1   1 1 
Obstetrical   1   1   
Open Heart Surgery   1   1   
Solid Organ Transplant   1   1 1 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)   1 1 1   
Psychiatric Beds   1   1 1 
Radiation Therapy/LinearAccelerator   1 1 1   
Rehabilitation       1 1 
Renal Dialysis       1   
Residential Care/Assisted Living           
Subacute Care       1 1 
Substance Abuse   1   1 1 
Swing Beds       1   
Ultra Sound       1   
Other     1     
Total No CON 21  Yes 9 Yes 28 Yes 11 Yes 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana 
GA  HI ID  IL  IN  
Air Ambulance           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1 1   1   
Burn Care   1       
Cardiac Cath 1 1   1   
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners   1       
Gamma Knives 1 1       
Home Health 1 1       
Hospice   1       
Hospitals/Beds 1 1   1   
ICF/MR 1 1   1   
Lithotripsy 1 1       
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1 1   1   
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners   1       
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)   1       
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1   1   
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1 1   1   
Obstetrical 1 1   1   
Open Heart Surgery 1 1   1   
Solid Organ Transplant   1   1   
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners) 1 1       
Psychiatric Beds 1 1   1   
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 1 1       
Rehabilitation 1 1   1   
Renal Dialysis   1   1   
Residential Care/Assisted Living           
Subacute Care   1   1   
Substance Abuse 1 1       
Swing Beds   1   1   
Ultra Sound   1       
Other 1     1   
Total 18 Yes 27 Yes No CON 16 Yes No CON 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine 
IA KS KY LA ME 
Air Ambulance         1 
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1   1   1 
Burn Care         1 
Cardiac Cath 1   1   1 
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners         1 
Gamma Knives         1 
Home Health     1     
Hospice     1     
Hospitals/Beds 1   1   1 
ICF/MR 1   1 1   
Lithotripsy         1 
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1   1   1 
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners     1   1 
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)     1   1 
Nursing Home/Beds 1   1 1 1 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)     1   1 
Obstetrical         1 
Open Heart Surgery 1   1   1 
Solid Organ Transplant 1   1   1 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)     1   1 
Psychiatric Beds     1   1 
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 1   1   1 
Rehabilitation     1   1 
Renal Dialysis         1 
Residential Care/Assisted Living       1   
Subacute Care           
Substance Abuse     1   1 
Swing Beds         1 
Ultra Sound         1 
Other     1     
Total 9 Yes No CON 19 Yes 3 Yes 24 Yes 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi 
MD MA  MI  MN MS  
Air Ambulance   1 1     
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1 1 1   1 
Burn Care 1         
Cardiac Cath 1   1   1 
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners     1     
Gamma Knives   1 1   1 
Home Health 1       1 
Hospice 1       1 
Hospitals/Beds 1   1   1 
ICF/MR 1       1 
Lithotripsy   1 1     
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1   1   1 
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners   1 1   1 
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)     1     
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1 1   1 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1 1 1     
Obstetrical 1         
Open Heart Surgery 1 1 1   1 
Solid Organ Transplant 1 1 1     
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)   1 1   1 
Psychiatric Beds 1 1 1   1 
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator   1 1   1 
Rehabilitation 1 1     1 
Renal Dialysis         1 
Residential Care/Assisted Living           
Subacute Care           
Substance Abuse 1 1     1 
Swing Beds     1   1 
Ultra Sound           
Other 1 1 1     
Total 17 Yes 15 Yes 19 Yes No CON 18 Yes 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada 
New 
Hampshire 
MO MT NE  NV NH 
Air Ambulance           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)   1   1 1 
Burn Care           
Cardiac Cath 1       1 
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners 1         
Gamma Knives 1         
Home Health   1       
Hospice           
Hospitals/Beds 1     1 1 
ICF/MR 1 1   1   
Lithotripsy 1         
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1       1 
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners 1       1 
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc) 1       1 
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1 1 1 1 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)           
Obstetrical           
Open Heart Surgery         1 
Solid Organ Transplant           
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners) 1       1 
Psychiatric Beds         1 
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 1       1 
Rehabilitation 1 1 1   1 
Renal Dialysis           
Residential Care/Assisted Living 1         
Subacute Care   1       
Substance Abuse   Y     1 
Swing Beds   1       
Ultra Sound           
Other 1         
Total 15 Yes 7 Yes 2 Yes 4 Yes 13 Yes 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
New Jersey New Mexico New York 
North 
Carolina 
North Dakota 
NJ NM NY NC ND 
Air Ambulance           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)     1 1   
Burn Care 1   1 1   
Cardiac Cath 1   1 1   
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners     1 1   
Gamma Knives       1   
Home Health 1   1 1   
Hospice     1 1   
Hospitals/Beds 1   1 1   
ICF/MR 1     1   
Lithotripsy     1 1   
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1     1   
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners     1 1   
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)     1 1   
Nursing Home/Beds 1   1 1   
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1   1 1   
Obstetrical     1     
Open Heart Surgery 1   1 1   
Solid Organ Transplant 1   1 1   
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)       1   
Psychiatric Beds 1     1   
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator     1 1   
Rehabilitation 1   1 1   
Renal Dialysis     1 1   
Residential Care/Assisted Living       1   
Subacute Care       1   
Substance Abuse       1   
Swing Beds           
Ultra Sound           
Other       1   
Total 12 Yes No CON 18 Yes 26 Yes No CON 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island 
OH  OK  OR  PA RI 
Air Ambulance           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC)         1 
Burn Care           
Cardiac Cath         1 
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners         1 
Gamma Knives         1 
Home Health           
Hospice     1   1 
Hospitals/Beds         1 
ICF/MR   1       
Lithotripsy           
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC)     1   1 
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners         1 
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc)         1 
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1 1   1 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU)         1 
Obstetrical         1 
Open Heart Surgery         1 
Solid Organ Transplant         1 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners)         1 
Psychiatric Beds   1     1 
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator         1 
Rehabilitation         1 
Renal Dialysis           
Residential Care/Assisted Living           
Subacute Care   1     1 
Substance Abuse         1 
Swing Beds     1     
Ultra Sound           
Other   1       
Total 1 Yes 5 Yes 4 Yes No CON 20 Yes 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
South 
Carolina 
South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah 
SC SD TN TX UT  
Air Ambulance           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1   1     
Burn Care     1     
Cardiac Cath 1   1     
Business Computers           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners           
Gamma Knives 1         
Home Health 1   1     
Hospice 1   1     
Hospitals/Beds 1   1     
ICF/MR 1   1     
Lithotripsy 1   1     
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1   1     
Medical Office Buildings           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners 1   1     
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc) 1         
Nursing Home/Beds 1   1     
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1   1     
Obstetrical           
Open Heart Surgery 1   1     
Solid Organ Transplant           
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners) 1   1     
Psychiatric Beds 1   1     
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 1   1     
Rehabilitation 1   1     
Renal Dialysis           
Residential Care/Assisted Living           
Subacute Care 1   1     
Substance Abuse 1   1     
Swing Beds     1     
Ultra Sound           
Other 1   1     
Total 21 Yes No CON 21 Yes No CON No CON 
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Vermont Virginia Washington 
West 
Virginia 
Wisconsin Wyoming 
VT VA WA  WV WI  WY  
Air Ambulance 1           
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 1 1 1 1     
Burn Care 1   1       
Cardiac Cath 1 1 1 1     
Business Computers 1           
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners 1 1   1     
Gamma Knives 1 1         
Home Health 1   1 1     
Hospice 1   1 1     
Hospitals/Beds 1 1 1 1     
ICF/MR 1 1   1 1   
Lithotripsy 1 1         
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 1 1 1 1     
Medical Office Buildings 1           
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners 1 1   1     
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc) 1 1   1     
Nursing Home/Beds 1 1 1 1 1   
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 1 1 1 1     
Obstetrical 1 1 1 1     
Open Heart Surgery 1 1 1 1     
Solid Organ Transplant 1 1 1 1     
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners) 1 1   1     
Psychiatric Beds 1 1 1 1     
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 1 1   1     
Rehabilitation 1 1 1 1     
Renal Dialysis 1   1 1     
Residential Care/Assisted Living 1           
Subacute Care 1   1   1   
Substance Abuse 1     1     
Swing Beds 1   1       
Ultra Sound 1           
Other   1 1 1     
Total 31 Yes 20 Yes 18 Yes 22 Yes 3 Yes No CON  
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Appendix 2:  CON Services by State 2010 
Number of States with CON for Service 
  
Air Ambulance 7 
Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASC) 27 
Burn Care 12 
Cardiac Cath 26 
Business Computers 1 
Computed Tomography (CT) Scanners 13 
Gamma Knives 16 
Home Health 17 
Hospice 18 
Hospitals/Beds 28 
ICF/MR 22 
Lithotripsy 16 
Long Term Acute Care (LTAC) 27 
Medical Office Buildings 2 
Magnetic Resonance Imagining (MRI) Scanners 19 
Mobile Hi Technology (CT/MRI/PET, etc) 16 
Nursing Home/Beds 37 
Neonatal Intensive Care (NICU) 23 
Obstetrical 15 
Open Heart Surgery 25 
Solid Organ Transplant 21 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET Scanners) 20 
Psychiatric Beds 26 
Radiation Therapy/Linear Accelerator 23 
Rehabilitation 25 
Renal Dialysis 12 
Residential Care/Assisted Living 5 
Subacute Care 14 
Substance Abuse 18 
Swing Beds 12 
Ultra Sound 4 
Other 18 
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Appendix 3. 
Hypothesis #1 Summary 
 
Transplant Centers per State 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 4.94 
NonCON > CON 
df = 307 t = -2.397 Sig = .017 Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 5.108 Sig = .025 Significant 
 
Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 0.01317 
CON > NonCON 
df = 307 t = -.847 Sig = .398 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = .717 Sig = .398 Not Significant 
 
Heart Transplant Centers per State 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 4.62 
NonCON > CON 
df = 99 t = -1.206 Sig = .231 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.245 Sig = .267 Not Significant 
 
Kidney Transplant Center per State 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 5.11 
NonCON > CON 
df = 206 t = -2.071 Sig = .040 Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 3.870 Sig = .051 Significant 
 
Heart Transplant Centers per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 0.0059 
CON > NonCON 
df = 99 t = -.510 Sig = .611 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = .260 Sig = .611 Not Significant 
 
Kidney Transplant Center per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 0.0169 
CON > NonCON 
df=206 t =-.665 Sig=.507 Not Significant 
ANOVA df=1 F=.443 Sig=.507 Not Significant 
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Hypothesis #2 Summary 
 
Transplant Volume per Center 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 15.4 
CON > NonCON 
df = 307 t = .565 Sig = .572 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = .319 Sig = .572 Not Significant 
 
Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff = 2.0764 
CON > NonCON 
df = 307 t = 1.187 Sig = .236 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.408 Sig = .236 Not Significant 
 
Heart Transplant Volume per Center 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff =  
CON > NonCON 
df = 99 t = -.022 Sig = .983 Not significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = .000 Sig = .983 Not Significant 
 
Kidney Transplant Volume per Center 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff =  
CON > NonCON 
df = 206 t = 1.024 Sig = .307 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.048 Sig = .307 Not Significant 
 
Heart Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff =  
CON > NonCON 
df = 99 t = -.071 Sig = .944 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = .005 Sig = .944 Not Significant 
 
Kidney Transplant Volume per 100,000 Residents 
 
Independent Sample T-Test Mean Diff =  
CON > NonCON 
df = 206 t = 1.407 Sig = .161 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.980 Sig = .161 Not Significant 
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Hypothesis #3 Summary 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  df = 307 t = -1.841 Sig = .067 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 3.390 Sig = .067 Not Significant 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures – Heart (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  df = 99 t = -1.590 Sig = .115 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1  F = 2.528 Sig = .115 Not Significant 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Graft Failures – Kidney (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  df = 206 t = -1.044 Sig = .298 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.091 Sig = .298 Not Significant 
 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  df = 307 t = -1.068 Sig = .287 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 1 F = 1.140 Sig = .287 Not Significant 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths – Heart (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  df = 99 t = -1.517 Sig = .133 Not Significant 
ANOVA df = 99 F = 2.457 Sig = .120 Not Significant 
 
Ratio of Observed to Expected Patient Deaths – Kidney (1 year) 
 
Independent Sample T-Test  Df = 206 t = -.564 Sig = .574 Not Significant 
ANOVA Df = 206 F = .043 Sig = .836 Not Significant 
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